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The New Environmental History
In this volume of Sustain, we have four examples of the new environmental history as
being practiced by environmental historians today. Chad Montrie looks beyond the nor-
mal actors to find a core of environmentalism among common folk of Appalachia. While
traditional environmental histories find the roots of our concern for the environment in
the writings of elites or political activists such as Theodore Roosevelt or Gilford Pinchot,
Montrie’s study brings us into the homes and actions of farmers and miners in the hills
of West Virginia and eastern Kentucky. Unlike most popular histories of the conservation
movement, Montrie finds that the more familiar conservation organizations were not so
much pushing local activists as holding them back. In his focus on local grassroots
activism and an indigenous appreciation of the natural world, Montrie opens up our
understanding of the origins of environmentalism.
The article by Sara Lynn Cunningham also helps us appreciate a different perspective
on environmental history. Abandoning the traditional vision of wilderness and country-
side, Cunningham, following in the footsteps of Martin Melosi and Joel Tarr, focuses on
the city and its wastes. In an in-depth case study of Louisville’s decisions concerning
waste and sewage, Cunningham discovers that there is still more to learn about how we
come to make decisions about the disposal of waste. She argues that Tarr’s understand-
ing about how and why cities made decisions about what type of sewage system to
install, needs to be rethought. At least for Louisville, Kentucky the story is more com-
plicated and nuanced than Tarr assumes.
Jonathan Free brings an environmental perspective to the history of a local business.
Looking at the emergence of the Louisville Slugger, Free ties together the history of
baseball with an increasingly urbanized population’s longing for a pastoral past. Free not
only links the Louisville Slugger to the growing market engendered by the commercial-
ization of products tied to a game resonating with rural images and ideals, but also to the
natural resource that made the Louisville Slugger possible, the nation’s forests. Free
shows how an environmental angle transforms our understanding of familiar institutions
and histories. 
Forests and parks have long been a mainstay of conservation history. Textbooks of
American history inevitably have several pages devoted to the creation of our national
parks and the story of Theodore Roosevelt’s and Gilford Pinchot’s campaign to protect
our national forests. What we know little about is the role of private individuals and foun-
dations in protecting and preserving our non-public natural space. And unlike our under-
standing of the public battles over conservation, we know little about the conflicts of
vision involved in early private conservation activity. Erin Henle’s article on Bernheim
Forest addresses that issue. Henle investigates the story of a private preserve and how
many of the issues that resonated in our national conservation debates also were played
out in the establishment and maintenance of private preserves as well. 
John T. Cumbler, Professor
Department of History
University of Louisville
Most historians date the beginning of the modern environ-
mental movement to Earth Day, April 22,1970. Earth Day was a
response to Senator Gaylord Nelson’s call for a national teach-in
on the environment similar to those that helped mobilize the anti-
war movement against the atrocity that was occurring in Viet
Nam, to call attention to the need to protect and maintain our
world. Nelson’s call was very timely. Americans were still expe-
riencing a period of unparalleled prosperity that was rooted in the
reforms of the New Deal and Fair Deal of the 1930s and 1940s.
Thanks to the unionization of a third of the workforce, govern-
ment housing and education programs, and the New Deal labor
laws and retirement system, a majority of Americans enjoyed a
forty hour work week, paid vacations, security in old age, and a
relatively high level of education. Increasingly Americans used
their vacations to get away from the city and recreate in local,
state, and national parks. They bought homes with large back
yards, put out bird feeders and sat back to watch their children
grow up healthy, educated and happy.
For, especially white Americans, the twenty-five years fol-
lowing World War II were good times.1 But they were also trying
times. Despite the early successes of Lyndon Johnson’s war on
poverty, government funds were increasingly being drawn away
from domestic programs to pay for the politically and morally
problematic war in Viet Nam. The children who flooded into the
expanded higher education system began to use their education to
challenge the status quo and the assumptions behind it. African-
Americans long denied not only access to the American dream
but also basic American liberties guaranteed by the constitution,
challenged segregation, discrimination and unequal opportunity.
This challenge manifested itself in demonstrations, court actions,
and civil disobedience. As the war in Viet Nam dragged on, more
and more young people took to the streets and the voting booths
demanding its end. The energy released by the civil rights move-
ment and the student and anti-war movements not only energized
a generation, they also worked to democratize American politics. 
In such a context, Nelson’s call for a day of action in support
of the environment fell upon receptive ears. Environmentalists
from a wide range of opinions embraced the idea, and to quote
Senator Nelson, “it began to be carried by its own momentum.”
Under the general direction of Denis Hayes, Earth Day was
planned to reach the broadest possible constituency. As many as
twenty million Americans from all walks of life marched, held
teach-ins, rallies, festivals and demonstrations to demand the
nation take notice of its environment and act as better stewards.
Although they were not the organizers of Earth Day, the concern
over the environment raised by Earth Day was soon felt by older
conservation organizations. Membership in the Sierra Club
jumped almost 50 percent while the Audubon Society grew from
120,000 in 1970 to 400,000 by the end of the decade. Congress
pushed through the Clean Air Act in 1970 and followed with the
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.
The modern environmental movement had an impact on col-
lege campuses as well where the practice of teach-ins originated.
College students were in the forefront of the Earth Day actions,
and back on their campuses they asked their professors probing
questions about the environment and how it should be protected.
Many of these professors were themselves activists in this new
movement and ready for these questions. In disciplines from the
sciences to the humanities, including history, academics began to
ask how they could bring their subject areas to address the ques-
tions being asked about the environment.
Historians study the past. They are interested in change over
time and what accounts for that change and what the impact of
that change is. Many historians also believe that understanding
the past and removing myth and false assumptions about the past
will help us better understand the present and better equip us to
make intelligent decisions as we move forward. Historians con-
cerned about the environment came to believe that if we better
understood the history of our interaction with the natural world,
how we have changed that world and how it has changed us, how
we have understood our physical world and the consequences of
our actions and beliefs, we might be in a better position to make
intelligent decisions about the future. We might be able to see
alternative possibilities and better avoid destructive patterns of
behavior.
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Although historians tend to date the beginning of the modern
environmental movement at Earth Day, 1970, they also recognize
that concern over the environment long predated Earth Day. There
are the writings of Henry David Thoreau in the mid-19th century
and George Perkins Marsh, both of who gave us a realization not
only of human impact on the environment, positive and negative,
as well as a call for altering our destructive and ravenous relations
with the natural world.2 By the end of the nineteenth century, sev-
eral writers and activists were calling attention to our wasteful use
of resources and how we needed to redirect the way we interact
with nature. John Muir (founder of the Sierra Club in 1892) began
writing popular accounts of the natural beauty of the west along
with calls to protect that beauty. Hunters and wildlife enthusiasts
such as Theodore Roosevelt, and George Grinnell, editor of Field
and Stream and one of the originators of the Audubon Clubs,
founded the Boone and Crocket Club to protect habitat for
wildlife. Public health advocates like Helen Swallow Richards,
Alice Hamilton, George Warring and Henry Ingersoll Bowditch,
and community activists such as Jane Adams, and those involved
in municipal women’s clubs publicized the dangers of air and
water pollution and called for clean and safe environments.
Politicians such as Teddy Roosevelt and foresters like Bernard
Fernow and Gilford Pinchot were increasingly calling attention to
the wasteful and destructive exploitation of the nation’s natural
resources. Historians have tended to view these voices and
actions as the origins of the modern conservation movement . 
The conservation movement itself was divided between those
such as John Muir who were calling for the preservation of the
nation’s beauty with the creation of protected places, national
parks, where Americans could come and contemplate nature’s
wonders, and those such as Gilford Pinchot who believed the
nation’s resources should be used but in a rational, reasonable,
and sustainable fashion. The conflict between these two views of
conservation broke into the open when Gilford Pinchot supported
building a dam and flooding the Hetch Hetchy valley. Muir con-
sidered the act a crime against “nature’s cathedral” while Pinchot
felt it was a practical answer to the crying need for water in San
Francisco. 
For the first generation of environmental historians, the his-
tories of this early conservation movement, their controversies
and the philosophies behind them, were the heart of environmen-
tal history. Yet as the environmental movement embraced not just
conservation but a new view of the environment that encom-
passed the concept of ecology , environmental historians began to
look deeper at their understanding of history. Although John Muir
and George Perkins Marsh articulated the idea that nature was a
complex interdependent system and that a major disruption of one
part of the system radically effected the whole, it took the scien-
tific work of Eugene Odum in the 1950s to awaken scientists to
the idea that plants and animals evolve together in an eco-system.
These ideas were popularized by Aldo Leopold in his post-
humously published Sand County Almanac and Rachel Carson in
a series of popular articles and books.4
Three historians, Donald Worster in his book, The Dust
Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s(1979), Sam Bass Warner
in The Way We Really Were(1983), and William Cronon in
Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New
England(1983), broke new ground for historians by using an eco-
logical approach to looking at historical change.5 Such an
approach required the historian to look not only at human activi-
ty but also to how that activity affected the natural world and how
the natural world affected human activity. They brought the his-
torical stage, so to speak, into the story of history. If plants and
animals are interconnected in an eco-system and the behavior or
existence of one effects the others, then humans also act within an
eco-system and effect the existence of plants and animals and are
effected in turn by their existence in that eco-system. Although
this seems fairly sensible today, much of past historical writing,
with the exception of historical-geography, was written as if the
natural world were a simple empty stage upon which human’s
constructed their history without regard to the underlying world.
Just as Earth Day encouraged historians to look at the envi-
ronment, so to did changes in the environmental movement
encourage historians to broaden their historical inquiry. As early
as 1962, Harry Caudill, a newspaper publisher from Kentucky,
wrote Night Comes to the Cumberlands, a devastating critique of
the environmental and human exploitation of the hill country of
eastern Kentucky. That same year, a marine biologist, Rachel
Carson, in her now famous, Silent Spring, called attention to the
problems of chemical pesticides in our environment. Taking an
ecological perspective, Carson argued that when we spray chem-
ical poisons into the environment, not just the targeted pest is
harmed. Although smeared by the chemical industry as a crank,
Carson’s work caught the attention of hundreds of Americans and
got people thinking about how modern life might be poisoning
the planet. Following the publication of Silent Spring, Americans
also began to notice more and more examples of how modern life
was compromising the very world we depended upon.
Newspapers and magazines began printing stories about the death
of Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River that was so badly polluted
it caught fire. In late 1978, a small working class suburb in
Niagara Falls, New York captured the nation’s attention when a
homeowner, Lois Gibbs, who thought she was moving to a nice
safe neighborhood to raise her children, realized that the series of
unusual illnesses that plagued her family were also affecting her
neighbors. An investigation by local residents showed a pattern of
unusual illnesses among the families of Love Canal. It turned out
that their nice safe neighborhood had been built on a toxic waste
dump of the Hooker Chemical Company. The company had
dumped chemical wastes in an old canal bed and then filled it
over without informing the neighbors that their community sat
upon a toxic mix of industrial chemicals. A school and play-
ground were then built over the waste dump. When the Hooker
Chemical Company and local officials ignored the concerns of
the community, Lois Gibbs organized demonstrations in front of
public officials and eventually took her case to Washington.
Gibbs and her neighbors were so frustrated that at one point 500
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of them confronted two EPA officials and held them hostage for
five hours until someone finally took their concerns seriously. The
leaders of the Love Canal campaign were women as symbolized
by one of their more dramatic demonstrations, a “Mothers’ Day
Die-In.” Soon other women’s groups were organizing to protest
corporate generated toxins and their threat to community health. 
Dramatic fish kills that followed excessive chemical loads
brought the problem of water pollution to public awareness. With
the expansion of vacation time and increased prosperity, more and
more Americans were vacationing at local and distant beaches,
lakes and rivers and the popularity of recreational fishing grew
dramaticaly. The collapse of fish stocks not only in inland water-
ways and lakes, but also along the coast enraged recreational fish-
ers and led to public protests over chemicals being dumped into
public waterways. 
In 1979 a new symbol of corporate irresponsibility and per-
sonal greed emerged in Bullitt County Kentucky. After com-
plaints began to circulate about a massive 1,500 barrel dump
known as “Valley of the drums” (see cover photo) consisting of
50 gallon leaking drums of toxic materials in a valley outside of
Louisville, Kentucky, the EPA launched an investigation that
brought to light the frightening underside of the chemical indus-
try’s “better living through chemistry.” Between 1940 and 1980
the production of synthetic organic chemicals increased from less
than 10 billion tons to over 350 billion tons. Chemical and indus-
trial companies throughout the north central and northeast United
States had been accumulating thousands of tons of highly toxic
waste over the years particularly from 1940 to 1980. Increasingly,
public landfills were reluctant to take on these wastes forcing
industry to look for other sites for their disposal. The original
advantage of these chemicals was their longevity. But by the late
1960s people began to realize that longevity had long-term nega-
tive consequences for the environment. Their persistence led to a
buildup of toxins within the environment, in our waters, soil and
air. DDT ingested by birds was leading to weak shells and empty
nests. High concentrations of DDT, PVC and mercury lead to
warnings not to eat fish caught in our major waterways.
Herbicides 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D were building up in soils and water-
ways. Government studies revealed that over 90% of all
Americans have measurable levels of hazardous substances such
as ethyl phenol, ethyl benzene, toluene and styrene in their bod-
ies.
Images of the “Valley of the Drums” were published in local
newspapers and even found themselves on the cover of Time
Magazine. Investigators found that companies around the country
were simply contracting to whoever came forward to haul away
their toxic wastes. In the case of the “Valley of the Drums,” a
Kentuckian hauled the drums, many of them unlabeled or with the
labels corroded off, to Kentucky and simply dumped them in the
valley. The companies where the toxins originated asked no ques-
tions and the dumper offered no assurances of safe disposal.
It soon became clear that although the “Valley of the Drums”
offered dramatic images, the pattern was not just a Kentucky phe-
nomena. Indeed, toxic dumps began to be uncovered across the
country. In Woburn, MA local citizens challenged the W.R. Grace
Company, which became the subject of a best selling book A Civil
Action by Jonathan Harr, and a popular movie. Times Beach,
Missouri, was so badly polluted that the entire town had to be per-
manently evacuated, and in 1982 the EPA attempted to locate a
toxic waste dump in a low income African-American community
in Warren County, North Carolina. As in the case of Love Canal,
local residents organized demonstrations and attempted to block
entrance to the community of trucks bearing toxic soil. The
demonstrations in Warren Country linked concern over the envi-
ronment with racial justice leading to a new focus on the problem
of environmental justice.
The Carter Administration responded to these revelations
with new legislation in 1980,the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, known as the
Superfund to attempt to address the problem of toxic waste
dumps. Although the Superfund is now effectively broke and
dozens of toxic areas still need addressing, it did work to clean up
some of the nation’s more notorious hazardous sites.
Environmental historians were influenced by these events
and focused more of their attention on the historical origins of
these problems. They began to look not only at the origins of
parks and wilderness areas or the ecological basis of land use,
they increasingly began to ask questions about the history of
water and air pollution, waste disposal and patterns of discrimi-
nation and racism in the citing of toxic dumps. Environmental
historians broadened their research interest to urban and suburban
spaces, and began to put environmental change in larger regional
water-ways and sky-ways perspective.7
Environmentalism is now a world-wide movement.
Increasingly it has become apparent that what were once local
problems are now international, indeed Global problems. Citizen
groups from South Asia to the artic are mobilizing to demand that
those in power address the concerns of a livable world. Political
organizations-Green Parties-focusing particularly on the environ-
ment, contest for state power in several European nations. While
Americans are mired in concerns about more petroleum, protect-
ing jobs in a fossil fuel economy, and chanting “drill baby drill,”
European countries as well as the Japanese are investing in wind
and solar energy projects and technology, and structuring an
economy with dramatically reduced carbon footprints. Although
environmental activism and actual policy change proceeded at a
much more advanced level in Europe over the last 30 years, the
United States could rightly claim to have been the originator of
that concern. Environmental activism burst onto the world stage
from this side of the Atlantic. And just as environmental activism
began here, so to did environmental history. American historians
dominated the field of environmental history for its first several
decades, but increasingly scholars in other parts of the world are
5
Fall/Winter 20096
beginning to dig more deeply into the physical world to under-
stand the relationship between people, the environment and
change. And just as Europeans have now moved far ahead of
America in environmental research, technology and policy, I
expect that European historians will also take the lead in the field
of environmental history. But scholarship is not an Olympic com-
petition. Environmental historians in North America realize that
in a world increasingly threatened by global environmental degra-
dation from collapsed world fisheries, acid rain, growing dead
zones in seas, to global warming, the more we know about how
we came to this sorry state the better we will be prepared to fend
off mindless chants of “drill baby drill,” and proceed thoughtful-
ly to a cleaner, safer, healthier world. 
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In 1960, the San Diego Evening Tribune featured an article
on the trees used to make Louisville Slugger baseball bats. For the
article, the Tribune interviewed Roscoe Hovatter, a bat salesman
for Hillerich & Bradsby, the producers of Louisville Slugger. The
paper asked Hovatter if he could foresee a time when the supply
of the company’s preferred tree, northern white ash, would
become scarce enough to effect bat production. “No,” Hovatter
replied, “not as long as tree farm principles of good forest man-
agement are followed on company-owned lands.”1 Nothing in the
article meant to suggest that Hovatter was an expert on forestry,
and while he was most likely expressing a personal opinion, he
also was obviously following one of the cardinal rules of good
salesmanship: create confidence in the product in the mind of
your customers. But Hovatter’s statement also reflected the com-
monly held assumption of the permanence of natural resources
that was still prevalent in America in the mid-twentieth century.
What Hovatter could not have predicted was that forty years later,
a small green insect would make its way from Asia to North
America through international trade routes, and would eventually
threaten all of the continent’s once abundant ash trees. That
insect, the emerald ash borer, that first appeared in North America
in Michigan in 1992, had by 1997 destroyed 25 million ash trees.
Despite efforts by state and federal authorities, the borer spread
from state to state at an alarming speed. In late June, 2007, the
borer was first spotted in Pennsylvania, the primary base of
Hillerich & Bradsby’s lumber holdings.2 As a result, for the first
time in 2008, Hillerich & Bradsby produced more Louisville
Sluggers made from maple trees than from ash.3
Of course, the situation created by the emerald ash borer was
not the first time non-human forces altered the course of the
Louisville Slugger brand’s history. Although the company has
produced aluminum bats under the Slugger brand since the 1970s,
its most iconic symbol is the wooden bat, and as a result, the his-
tory of the Louisville Slugger has been one of constant negotia-
tion with nature. As the most recognizable wooden product of the
last century, the changes in the production of the Louisville
Slugger illustrate the changing relationship between Americans
and their forests. Likewise, baseball’s emergence as the “national
pastime” was linked to changes in the relationships between
humans and the natural world. It’s no coincidence that baseball—
a game played on a field of grass and dirt using a modified tree
branch and cured animal hides as equipment—came of age dur-
ing a time of intensive urbanization and industrialization, as mil-
lions of Americans moved from the countryside to the city and
left their farms to take up work in factories. The game of baseball
became an outlet for the celebration of the pastoral ideal, with the
Louisville Slugger as one of its most enduring symbols. Both as
a commercial product of the timber industry and as a cultural arti-
fact, the Louisville Slugger helps us understand how the relation-
ship between Americans and their environment has changed in
the past one hundred and fifty years. 
For something so deeply engrained in American culture,
there is surprisingly little literature on the history of the Louisville
Slugger. Bob Hill, a writer for Louisville’s Courier-Journal, has
published a popular piece on the general history of the bat, but no
scholar has given the social and cultural impact of the Slugger
careful consideration.4 Regrettably, with the exception of a few
historians such as John Betts, the history of baseball also tends
towards celebrating the origins of the game rather than examining
its significance in light of the social upheaval that lead to its early
development.5 Most of the important work on the cultural signif-
icance of baseball has been done not by historians but by sociol-
ogists. Robert Henderson’s Ball, Bat, and Bishop explored the
origins of the “stick and ball” games that baseball evolved from,
while more recently, Ronald Story and Richard Guttman have
tried to understand how baseball, rather than any of the other
sports that were developing and growing in popularity in the mid-
nineteenth century, became the most popular American sport.6
Louisville Slugger’s status as a premier cultural icon warrants
serious historical consideration on its own, but the company’s
relationship with the natural world is especially instructive. 
J. Micheal Hillerich and his family emigrated from Baden-
Baden Germany to Baltimore in 1842, and moved to Louisville a
few years later. Hillerich was a wood-worker, and with his son,
John Frederich Hillerich opened a woodshop in downtown
Louisville in 1859.7 For its first twenty years, the shop was simi-
lar to any number of local woodworking businesses. Hillerich’s
lathes created porch posts and stair railings for a rapidly develop-
ing river city in constant need of building material.8 In the early
1880s, however, the shop began producing baseball bats.9 Before
the Hillerichs entered the bat business, the company’s claim to
fame was the invention of a hand-cranked butter churn, and
according to corporate lore, John Frederich was reluctant to
become involved with baseball, which he saw as a passing fad.10
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The Falls City Slugger, as the bats were known then, became
widely popular in a short span of time, and the shop’s bat business
grew rapidly. By the middle of the decade, the Hillerichs were
producing more than 200 different models designed specifically
for professional players.11
In 1907, the U.S. Congress created a baseball commission to
explore the origins of the sport. A.G. Spalding, already one of the
premier dealers of sports equipment, wrote in a letter to the com-
mission that baseball’s American origins were obvious. “The
game is thoroughly in accord with our national characteristics and
temperament,” he wrote, and that to imagine it developing inde-
pendent of America would be unimaginable.12 In fact, the game of
baseball most likely evolved out of a number of stick-and-ball
games, all of which had non-American origins. But the game rec-
ognizable as baseball does seem to have its origins in the earliest
years of the United States. By the early nineteenth century base-
ball clubs in growing urban centers, especially New York City,
were regularly challenging each other to “bass-ball” matches.13
As baseball grew in popularity throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth century, an idea of its special connection to
America—especially America’s past—grew. 
While this notion is obviously drenched in cliché, and con-
tinues into the present largely as a marketing tool for Major
League Baseball, by exploring baseball as a cultural manifesta-
tion we can understand how it became so integrally linked to
America. The Europeans, who settled in America and eventually
created the United States, experienced the transformation of
nature at a rate that was unprecedented. Although all civilizations
are the product of a negotiation with the natural world, European
America was carved out of the natural world so rapidly that truly
significant changes in the landscape were observable within the
span of a generation.14 By the nineteenth century, this transfor-
mation of the natural world was manifested in rapidly increasing
urbanization. From 1790 to 1850, the urban population of the
United States grew from five percent of the population to twenty
percent.15 Industrialization and the expanding market economy
spurred further urbanization in the latter part of the century. In
1900, the urban population of the nation was thirty million, more
than twice the number it was in 1880.16
The move from rural to urban life meant a fundamental
change in the way many Americans interacted with their environ-
ment, and led to various ways of renegotiating a relationship with
nature.17 The trend of creating more space and devoting more
time for outdoor recreation was one of the most universal ways of
dealing with this change. In 1857, after years of pressure from cit-
izens for more open space within the city to provide “refreshment
of the mind and nerves,” the city of New York began construction
on Central Park.18 Across the nation, urban reformers like Horace
Bushnell came to believe that open, green “breathing spaces”
within a city were essential to the mental, physical, and spiritual
well-being of the public.19 Baseball’s rise went hand-in-hand with
these developments. 
As more and more Americans moved from rural to urban
areas in the middle of the nineteenth century, baseball became a
way to ease the transition to urban life. New urbanites who may
have felt adrift after leaving their rural homes, and who often
moved between and within cities, were able to find social net-
works through the baseball “clubs” that organized in the major
cities.20 The game was also an outlet for the expression of the
ideal of manhood. As a sport, baseball offered more opportunity
for individual recognition, and as a result, required more person-
al responsibility, than a sport like American football, which was
also developing during the same time period. Spectators at a foot-
ball game may have noted the players in control of the ball at any
given moment, but often couldn’t observe the activities of those
who are performing in the jumble of bodies away from or around
the ball. Each position in baseball, on the other hand, afforded
each player specific and easily observable responsibilities. The
player was responsible for defending a certain area, or while on
offense, was alone against the entirety of the opposing team’s
defense, allowing for a more clear demonstration of his mas-
culinity.21
Beyond the opportunity to ease the social transition to the
city and to display masculine traits, baseball was also an oppor-
tunity to reconnect with the natural world in a pastoral setting. In
1838, the constitution of the Olympic Ball Club of Pennsylvania
noted that the “bracing and healthy vigor,” and the “hilarity and
good feeling,” garnered from time spent playing baseball in a
nearby field or pasture was one of the primary reasons for taking
part in the game. In Rochester, the baseball games played in a
nearby meadow were hailed as “leisure for rational and healthy
recreation.”22 As industrialization and urbanization increased
throughout the century, the perceived power of baseball to heal
physical and psychological wounds grew as well. In 1896, the
Sporting News interviewed Dr. Daniel Adams, an early member
of the New York Knickerbockers, one of early baseball’s most
influential clubs. Adams obviously viewed baseball as the prod-
uct of a simpler time, before the scars of industrialization and
urbanization could be seen across the land. He recalled playing
games on Elysian Fields, a “beautiful spot” during the early nine-
teenth century, “now cut up by railroad tracks.” To Adams, the
connection with the natural world found through baseball had
transformative power. Once the men in his club arrived at Elysian
Fields, away from the grime and grind of the city, Adams report-
ed, “we were free from all care.”23 Baseball’s pastoral signifi-
cance increased with the pace of industrialization far into the
twentieth century, and is especially noticeable in literature.24
Baseball became a game synonymous with the beginning of
spring, as well as the end of summer, metaphorically powerful
times in the seasonal cycle. Furthermore, baseball, unlike foot-
ball, was played free from the restraints of a clock, and was
dependant on good weather. Work that was regulated by a clock
was a significant change for new urbanites, used to the less time-
oriented labor of the farm, and baseball presented an opportunity
for a release from that rigidity. Games were also often canceled
because of rain, signaling a dependence on the natural world that
recently relocated farmers would have been comfortable with. 
In the early years of their bat business, the Hillerichs most
likely made bats from whatever wood a player requested. Since
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the development of the game, baseball bats had been anything but
uniform. Often, the bats would be made out of the “best cedar”,
but realistically, “a wagon spoke, or any nice straight stick,”
would do.25 Early on, each baseball club developed its own rules
for the game, and those normally left plenty of room for bat vari-
ation. In 1854, a list of rules for “New York” baseball stated that
the ball “shall weigh from 5 1/2 to 3 1/2 in diameter,” but con-
tained no such instructions for bats.26 Five years later in Boston,
however, The Baseball Player’s Pocket Companion instructed
players that the “bat must be round and must not exceed 2 1/2
inches in diameter in the thickest part,” and that it must be made
of wood, although it could be of any length.27 Obviously, no
stores existed in which a player could simply buy a baseball bat,
and there were as of yet no factories devoted to producing them,
so players visited local woodworking shops like the Hillerichs’s
to have wood transformed into a bat. Dr. D.L. Adams recalled that
he often had to oversee the turning of the bats himself to ensure
their quality, and that he was “often obliged to try three or four
turners to find one with suitable wood.”28
By 1912, ash had become the preferred wood for making the
Louisville Slugger, with hickory being the second most popular
choice. Ash trees grow mostly along the center of the central
hardwood forest, which stretches from New York to Georgia and
from Maryland to the prairie. The most common species of ash,
the white ash, soon became the most commonly used for making
bats. Although the tree is generally intolerant to shade, saplings
can grow quickly in the shadows of older trees, making second-
growth trunks grow straight, and therefore easier to convert into
the billets used to make bats.29 Hickory was more accessible than
ash, and was heavier. To some, its weight made it preferable, but
eventually players began opting for the lighter bats made from
ash. By the mid-nineteenth century, Louisville became an impor-
tant port on the Ohio, which gave seaboard merchants access to
the interior of the country, and connected them to the growing
commercial center of New Orleans, on the Mississippi, as well as
access to distant baseball markets. 
Louisville’s location on the Ohio River meant that in the
early years, the Hillerichs could count on being able to attain any
type of wood they needed. From its earliest days as a settlement,
Louisville benefitted from its location at the Falls of the Ohio.
Settlers floated down the Ohio on flatboats to Louisville, where
the boats were bought by local merchants and were either dis-
mantled to meet timber supply needs, or used to ship cargo far-
ther down the Ohio to the Mississippi River and eventually to
New Orleans.30 In the early nineteenth century, steamboats were
introduced to the river, and the new ability to ship goods up the
Ohio and Mississippi filled the city with merchants.31 By 1834,
New Orleans was the premier port of the nation, and Louisville’s
connection to it made it an essential part of the river lifeline. The
city’s population increased accordingly. Between 1830 and 1840,
Louisville’s population doubled to 21,210, making it the twelfth
largest city in the nation. By 1850, due to increased river traffic,
which brought not only population-attracting business, but a wave
of immigration, it was the tenth largest. Most importantly for the
city’s wealth of woodshops like the Hillerichs’s, though, the river
connected the city to the forests of New England and Appalachia.
The river link between the Appalachian Mountains and New
Orleans crossed only one fault line, and that was in Louisville. 
The city was connected to the New England forests by a
complex network of rivers that traversed the north eastern United
States. Before European settlement, the combination of natural
disturbances and Native Americans who burned swaths of timber
for their villages and to improve hunting, created a forest in the
New England region that was highly differentiated in age and
species. During the eighteenth century, settlers cleared the ash,
maple, and beech trees that grew on the sites that would become
the most productive for crops, while they harvested white pine,
oak, and chestnut for most of their lumber needs. The usefulness
and extra capital that timber provided settlers led to great defor-
estation between 1830 and 1880, when sixty to eighty percent of
the land in New England was cleared.32 As the “old growth” for-
est was being cut, fast growing species like ash and maple
squeezed out previously prevalent “pioneer” species such as the
white pine, birch, and poplar.33 Adding to the changes in the for-
est, caused by settlement, was the impact of the lumber industry.
The amount of lumber being cut grew from 1.6 million b.f. to 8
billion b.f. in 1859, and continued to rise.34 The majority of this
lumber was cut in New England, especially New York, where the
number of saw mills greatly outnumbered those in any other part
of the country.35 From there, it was loaded onto boats and floated
down river to markets. 
In 1912, however, John Frederick Hillerch noted, in an inter-
view with the Louisville Herald Magazine, that he preferred to
use wood from Kentucky.36 By the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, steamships were plowing up and down the waterways of
Kentucky to reach the previously untapped forests of Appalachia.
Soon, small one and two-man lumber operations formed through-
out the region, cutting down the best trees along the edges of
rivers and streams, and floating them to saw mills and settlements
downstream.37 By the 1890s, lumber companies had entered the
most remote areas of eastern Kentucky where they used the
Cumberland River to transport logs to mills in Pineville and
Williamsburg.38 Meanwhile, lumber companies were also looking
to railroads to help them transport logs to their mills. By 1910, the
Louisville & Nashville railroad had also reached Harlan County,
where lumber production began to skyrocket as a result.39
Louisville was an ideal location for the production of baseball
bats, with ready access to both the New England and Southern
Appalachian forests, both of which were rich in the types of trees
most commonly used for bats. 
Louisville’s role in the national transportation system also
helped to spread the word about the Louisville Slugger. Baseball
spread across the nation during the Civil War, as soldiers travelled
from town to town playing the game in their free time. In the post
war period, the game’s transition from an amateur sport to a pro-
fessional one was fostered by the increasing interconnectedness
of the nation’s cities, created by the railroad system. All of the
cities which contributed teams to the original National League,
including Chicago, Boston, New York, St. Louis, and
9
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Philadelphia, were connected by rail.40 Louisville was central in
the formation of the league, hosting the discussions that led to it,
as well as fielding a local team, the Louisville Grays.41 Players
heard of the Louisville Slugger from each other, and would stop
by the Hillerich shop while in town to order a bat of their own. By
the late nineteenth century, the
popularity of the Louisville
Slugger grew nationally as more
and more professional players
began using the bat, and the com-
pany expanded its marketing
strategies. In 1905, Honus Wagner
signed a contract with J.F.
Hillerich & Son to promote the
Louisville Slugger, and became
one of the first celebrity endorsers
of a commercial product. Six
years later, Frank Bradsby became
a partner in the company. Bradsby,
a former athletic goods buyer from
St. Louis, Missouri, originated the
practice of producing replicas of
professional model bats with the
pros’ signatures burned into the
wood for sale to youth.42 The idea was a huge success. The abili-
ty to use a facsimile of one’s favorite pro baseball player’s bat
eventually made the Louisville Slugger the most popular bat in
the country. In the span of thirty years, baseball bats had become
the primary product of Hillerich & Bradsby. 
By the 1920s, the company was also coming to terms with
the limitations placed upon its production by the natural world. It
was not alone. Concern with the excessive use of America’s
forests predated the Civil War and grew throughout the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. Numbers of scientists,
philosophers, and government officials from Henry David
Thoreau, John Muir and George Perkins Marsh, to Gifford
Pinchot, as well as many average citizens had expressed concern
over the overuse of the nation’s timber supply.43 In 1921, the
Report of the Forester to the Department of Agriculture noted the
“serious situation as to the timber supply.”44 The report cited the
fact that “three-fifths of the virgin forests of this country,” had dis-
appeared and that “a present drain upon our remaining forests,”
was “over four times their yearly production of wood.”45 Four
years later, Hillerich & Brasdby released a pamphlet to sporting
goods dealers citing the fact that timber for bats was growing
scarcer. Top quality second growth ash had become increasingly
difficult for the company to obtain, and it had become necessary
to go farther for it, and to “seek sources of supply in real back-
woods.”46
The company had reason to be concerned. As the demand for
Louisville Slugger bats increased, the company’s timber con-
sumption continued to rise dramatically. Between 1944 and 1947,
the company went from using 532,146 total pieces of ash and
571,157 pieces of hickory to 1,117,377 pieces of ash and
1,525,257 pieces of hickory.47 The need to search out lumber in
“real backwoods” continued in the 1940s as ash trees became
increasingly scarce. Lumber companies that supplied wood to
Hillerich & Bradsby, like K Lumber Company in New Haven,
Connecticut, needed to build roads to get to the timber.48 Old
growth hickory was still more readily available than ash, but by
the 40s, the heavy bats that it pro-
duced were no longer preferred by
modern players.49 To help alleviate
the lumber supply problem, a num-
ber of bat manufacturers and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Forest Products Laboratory in
Madison, Wisconsin, collaborated
to design a laminated bat. The lam-
inated bat was made of three
pieces of wood, a combination of
both hickory and ash, and was
designed to eliminate the chipping
that occurred with ash bats, as well
as to help stretch the supply of
wood for bat production.50
Although Hillerich & Bradsby
claimed to have been experiment-
ing with the technology for thirty
five years, and believed it to create an inferior product, Major
League Baseball approved the bat for use in 1953.51 The laminat-
ed bat never caught on with players, though, and Hillerich &
Bradsby’s lumber issues remained unresolved. 
The company decided that the best white ash came from the
rocky ridges and hillsides of Pennsylvania and New York and in
the mid-fifties, purchased Larimer & Norton, a lumber company
with operations in Eastern Pennsylvania and Western New York.
With a vertically integrated lumber division, Hillerich & Bradsby
now managed its own lumber supply more effectively, and was
able to control grading and the quality of wood it received. In
1957, the company opened a manufacturing plant in Strattanville,
PA, under Larimer & Norton. The plant, which the local paper
described as “situated in the natural range of white ash timber
which grows in the northern Appalachian mountain areas,” trans-
formed cut logs into billets that were shipped by rail to Louisville
to be made into Sluggers. Each day, the wood received at the
plant, most of which came from woodlots of local farmers, who
had previously used white ash mostly for firewood, was made into
1,600 billets that would later be used to produce bats.52 By 1960,
continued concern over the supply of quality lumber led Hillerich
& Bradsby to create a 630 acre “tree farm” in Warren Co, PA,
where it was able to grow many of the trees it used for bat pro-
duction.53 But, it still received wood from other sources. These
were usually small lumber operations in towns like Grantsville,
Maryland, or like Earl Hagan’s of French Lick, Indiana, who col-
lected wood from loggers in Kentucky, Indiana, and Southern
Illinois, and shipped the roughs to Louisville to become
Sluggers.54
In the 1960s, the U.S. Forestry Service adopted the policy of
clear-cutting as its preferred method of harvesting trees, aban-
The abil i ty to use a facsimile of
one’s favorite pro baseball
player ’s bat eventually made
the Louisvi l le Slugger the most
popular bat in the country.
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doning the forest practice first established by the conservationists
of Gifford Pinchot’s generation. Before long, the section of the
public which took recreation time in the forests as a way to recon-
nect with nature, began to notice. Clear-cutting was more than
just aesthetically unappealing. As historian and ecologist Samuel
Hays has written, the destruction of whole forest ecosystems
through clear-cutting, “had the potential of moving the interested
citizen in a new direction, toward a more complex and more com-
prehensive ecological view of what had been destroyed and what
should be preserved.”55 The practice of clear-cutting became a ral-
lying cry against the unsustainable practices of the lumber indus-
try, and every segment of the industry began to feel the pressure.
Hillerich & Bradsby was no exception. In 1971, corporate execu-
tive Jack McGrath composed a hand written memo titled “Our
Answer to the Ecology Racketeers.” In it, McGrath observed that
“with many sincere and insincere folks jumping on the ecology
wagon to make a fast buck, we should be ready for someone to
bring out that six million bats use up a lot of trees.” McGrath
noted that the company’s tree consumption meant “less foliage,
less water, less oxygen, less wildlife, less etc.,” and wondered if
the company had prepared “statistics on forests,” or had informa-
tion to prove that “ash is self-propagating.”56
While all sectors of the lumber industry were reluctant to
change practices they had developed to increase profits, public
and political pressure soon forced ecological forestry on the
industry.57 Hillerich & Bradsby was in a better position than most
to change its practices. Although by the end of the 60s, low-end
timber had been more difficult to come by than it was before, the
biggest supply problem facing the Louisville Slugger was a lum-
ber surplus.58 Thanks in part to hard times in the furniture indus-
try, the company saw an increase in the number of logs it could
procure as well as in workers trained to operate lathes.59 In 1970,
the company’s timber yard in Louisville was receiving wood at a
faster rate than the factory could take the pieces and convert them
into bats. Outdoor stockpiles of wood went unused, which led to
more wet, cracked, and fungus infected pieces that weren’t suit-
able for bat production.60 In 1972, Larimar & Norton cut back on
its timber production, and instead focused on an “all-out” effort
to improve the quality of the wood making its way to Louisville.61
Also, due to the rise of the aluminum bat industry, which came to
dominate in every area except for professional baseball, the com-
pany saw a drop in the number of wooden bat orders. In 1969,
372,832 wooden Louisville Sluggers had been ordered by base-
ball teams across the country, but by 1978, that number had
dropped to 257,052.62
In 2001, San Francisco Giant Barry Bonds hit seventy three
home runs using a bat made out of maple. Soon, other Major
League players were interested in testing out maple bats to see if
they could achieve similar results. Meanwhile, the emerald ash
borer continued to spread across the country, from Michigan to
New York, laying its eggs just under the bark of ash trees, where
the larva devoured the trees’ phloem. Climate change created
warmer and more hospitable conditions for the borer, while
simultaneously degrading the quality of the ash trees growing in
Hillerich & Bradsby’s Pennsylvania forests.63 The combination of
the borer and the attention given to Bonds’s record breaking sea-
son caused a decline in the number of ash bats produced. But a
change in baseball bat production brought along by natural caus-
es should have come as no surprise to Hillerich & Bradsby. 
The most vital aspects of the company’s history have been
greatly impacted by the environment. The game of baseball itself
developed as the most popular American sport during a time of
great social upheaval. As increasing numbers of Americans
moved to the nation’s urban centers, baseball became a method of
reconnecting to the agrarian lifestyles they left behind.
Meanwhile, Louisville became a linchpin in the trade along the
Ohio River. The Ohio was a lifeline to the interior of the nation,
and whole forests worth of lumber flowed down it towards
Louisville. Later, railroads and steamboats connected the city to
the great Appalachian forests, and brought professional baseball
players through town on a regular basis. Above all, the production
of the Louisville Slugger has been dependent upon the supply of
quality timber. Hillerich & Bradsby’s mid-twentieth century
attempts to take full control of natural resources and manage them
for long-term sustainable yields reflected the widely held belief
that although humans had altered the natural world nearly to the
point of exhaustion, human ingenuity and reason could nurture
the environment back to health while maintaining a certain rate of
industrial progress. This concept is one that still informs many of
our current discussions on the change needed to meet the chal-
lenge of global climate change, and as the emerald ash borer has
recently revealed, it is one that we may need to question. 
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Despite a wealth of mineral resources, the people of southern
Appalachia are by most measures poor. For over a century now,
miners have extracted coal from bountiful reserves there and
loaded it on train cars to be used somewhere else, in factories or
at electric utilities typically beyond the region, with little in the
way of a fair return. Property and severance taxes were and are
still minimal, while the number of jobs that might pump wages
into the local economy has been in steady decline, mostly due to
ever more sophisticated methods to increase production with
fewer miners. This was, in fact, the main reason coal operators
shifted to surface mining after World War II. Simply removing the
layers of “overburden” on the side of a mountain, or these days
removing the whole top of a mountain, to get at a seam under-
neath, requires only a fraction of the labor force to extract the
same amount of coal. Additionally, operators can treat most of the
adverse environmental and social impacts this type of mining
causes as ‘externalities,’ leaving state or federal governments and
individual property owners to deal with the cost of acid mine
drainage, ruined roads, dry wells, cracked foundations, insuffer-
able dust, burst slurry dams, and devastating flooding.
Yet this is not to say that mountain residents have been silent
and passive in the face of their ‘colonial’ exploitation. During the
1960s and early 1970s, resistance was particularly fierce. In Pike
County, Kentucky, to cite just one example, people organized and
engaged in nonviolent direct action as well as industrial sabotage,
challenging not only coal operators but also the local political
officials (often one and the same) who did their bidding. This
happened most dramatically in the summer of 1967, when the
Puritan Coal Company threatened to advance on farmer Jink
Ray’s land (which they could do in Kentucky because courts had
ruled that broad form deeds, separating mineral and surface
rights, gave mineral owners the right to extract coal without a
landowners consent and without compensation for most dam-
ages). To stop the mining, anti-poverty activist Joe Mulloy put
Ray and his supporters in touch with the Appalachian Group to
Save the Land and People (AGSLP), they established their own
chapter, and when a Puritan bulldozer crossed Ray’s property
line, a group of nearly twenty-five people stood in the way and
forced it back. Shortly afterward, someone set off dynamite near
the mine machinery. “We mean to stop them,” explained retired
deep miner Bill Fields, “one way or another.”1
In the latter part of July, when a Puritan bulldozer tried once
more to clear Jink Ray’s land, activists blocked the path again and
convinced the governor to cancel the permit, but this was not the
end of the matter. In retaliation for the protests, the Pike County
Sheriff and the president of the Independent Coal Operators
Association (ICOA) visited anti-poverty activists Joe Mulloy and
Alan McSurely, to question them about their role in the actions.
Several days later, the Commonwealth Attorney and past ICOA
president Thomas Ratliff returned with fifteen armed deputies to
arrest the two men, as well as McSurely’s wife, and when long-
time civil rights and anti-poverty activists Carl and Anne Braden
came to bail them out of jail, they arrested them too. The charge
was attempting to overthrow the government of Pike County, a
violation of a 1920s sedition law. “From what I have seen of the
evidence in this case,” Ratliff said, “it is possible that Communist
sympathizers may have infiltrated the antipoverty program not
only in Pike County, but in other sections of the country as well.”
The objective of the antipoverty workers, he claimed, was “to stir
up dissension and create turmoil among our poor.”2
After the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled the old sedition
law unconstitutional, coal operators pressured Governor Breathitt
to end anti-poverty work in the region, which he did by making a
phone call to the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. The
next year, a new governor, Louis Nunn, worked with legislators to
establish a Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee, which
held hearings to investigate “communist” infiltration in activist-
minded groups, either to tie up their resources and impede organ-
izing or to shut them down entirely.3 Meanwhile, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals made clear that it was still a friend of coal by
reaffirming an earlier decision about the unrestricted rights of
mineral owners under broad form deeds. “It appears to us that if,
as we in substance are holding, the mineral owner bought and
paid for the right to destroy the surface in a good faith exercise of
the right to remove the minerals,” the justices concluded in
We Mean to Stop Them,
One Way or Another:
Coal, Power, and the
Fight Against Strip Mining
in Appalachia
Chad Montrie
Associate Professor of History
University of Massachusetts, Lowell
Fall/Winter 2009
Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., “then there is no basis upon
which there could rest an obligation to pay damages for exercis-
ing that right.”4
Revealing the proverbial iron fist inside the velvet glove,
reaction to the Pike County insurgency demonstrated that the
struggle there and elsewhere was, fundamentally, about a balance
of power. When mountain residents and their allies opposed strip-
ping for the poverty and environmental devastation it caused, they
challenged a long-established arrangement of social inequity and
political domination, one that worked quite effectively to facili-
tate the extraction of wealth from Appalachia. That same arrange-
ment is also what led experience-hardened activists to protest out-
side the law, using various forms of direct action, and to demand
abolition rather than regulatory legislation, which could be and
was so easily undermined by coal operators. “We are here to con-
sider and evaluate our position under the power of industrial cor-
ruption,” Warren Wright once declared at a 1971 “People’s
Hearing on Strip Mining.” Because judges and legislators were
too crooked and heartless, he insisted, “We must attempt to
bypass them.”5
With a keen sense of the stakes in the battle, however, coal
operators did not respond to the opposition solely with belliger-
ent tactics. In fact, they were much more successful in defending
their interests by showing calculated support for minimal regula-
tion. Like their opponents, they understood that any control laws
would be largely ineffectual, despite public statements that this or
that bill would make any surface mining completely unfeasible,
and they knew that the only real threat was the demand for a sur-
face mining ban. Consequently, trade association representatives,
coal company executives, and their allies in legislatures and
Congress strategically altered their position on regulatory bills as
abolition efforts waxed and waned. This approach ultimately paid
off, in 1977, with passage of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA). The law was weak and poorly
enforced, as expected, but it provided legal sanction and cover for
coal operators’ continued and even more devastating destruction
of the land and its people. For activists it was a resounding defeat,
and the opposition movement has only recently reformed and
recovered. 
The Movement and Its Decline
The militant drive to end stripping in Appalachia began in
eastern Kentucky, in the mid-1960s, and quickly spread to other
parts of the region. Kentucky was relatively late in establishing
even minimal controls on contour, area, and auger operations, and
it did as little as any state to enforce regulations. This gap in over-
sight, as well as a combination of steep hillsides and high average
rainfall that increased the potential for landslides and flooding,
pushed local residents to act. In 1960, Whitesburg lawyer Harry
Caudill introduced the first bill in the Kentucky legislature to ban
strip mining, and Letcher County resident Raymond Rash com-
plemented that effort with petitions calling for prohibition signed
by a thousand supporters. These efforts accomplished little, how-
ever, and a 1963 revision of the state’s control law also made an
imperceptible difference in how stripping was done. Then, in the
spring of 1965, coal operators Richard Kelley and Bill Sturgill
began a job in Clear Creek Valley, Knott County, provoking a
storm of active resistance throughout the area that did not let up
for several years.
The critical confrontation with strippers happened when bull-
dozers began threatening to cross onto property owned by the
stepson of Dan Gibson (the stepson was doing military service in
Vietnam at the time), at which point Dan and his neighbors stood
in the way. The next day, as clearing resumed, Dan went up to the
site with a rifle and again shut down the operation, until he was
arrested. When he got to jail, a large crowd formed outside,
charges were dropped, Dan was released, and a “big gang of out-
laws” gathered to block the bulldozers once more, finally getting
a promise from Bill Sturgill that he would not try to mine the fam-
ily property.6 A few weeks later, local residents from Knott, Perry,
and Letcher counties gathered for a meeting in Hindman, where
they declared their intention to resort to sit-ins, lie-ins, and even
guns to keep strip mine operators off their land. “We feel we have
been forsaken,” they explained, “that we have no rights when a
county sheriff can order a man off his own property and tell him
he is trespassing; that he will be jailed if he doesn’t readily com-
ply.”7 They also formed the Appalachian Group to Save the Land
and People (AGSLP), which in its name spoke to dual concerns
for the environmental destruction caused by stripping as well as
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the impact this devastation and the inevitable reduction in coal
mine employment had on communities.
One of the first initiatives by the AGSLP was a fifty-car
motorcade to the state capitol, where activists demanded a meet-
ing with the governor (which he reluctantly consented to), and
delivered petitions against stripping with 3000 signatures. That
night, Governor Breathitt told a symposium on strip mining that
operators would have to improve their methods and reclamation
practices or he would have to ask the state legislature for a ban.
In the fall, AGSLP also came to the aid of Ollie Combs and her
extended family, facing encroachment on their land by a Sturgill
operation in Honey Gap, Knott County. The group ran the bull-
dozers off with guns, but the workers eventually returned when
only Combs and her two sons were at home. The three sat down
in front of the machinery and were arrested and jailed, but they
embarrassed the Governor into public support once again when a
photograph of the “Widow Combs,” eating her Thanksgiving din-
ner behind bars, appeared on the front page of the state’s main
newspaper. Breathitt urged all citizens of the state to obey the law
but noted that “history has sometimes shown that unyielding
insistence upon the enforcement of legal rights by the rich and
powerful against the humble people of a community is not always
the quickest course of action.” And he had regulators revoke the
permit for the strip operation.8
Early in the next year, 1966, Kentucky legislators answered
the “clamor” in the coalfields with an updated regulatory law, yet
at the same time failed to pass a measure that would have required
operators working on a broadform deed to get a surface owners
consent and pay damages. The still inadequate controls and
uneven enforcement, besides the troubles caused by mineral
owner primacy, further demonstrated to activists the need for pro-
hibition. So they continued to organize, establishing new AGSLP
chapters, including the one in Pike County, and they continued to
resist, fighting with petitions, lawsuits, nonviolent direct action,
and, by the spring of 1967, industrial sabotage. That April, some-
one dynamited a diesel shovel at a Kentucky Coal River strip
mine in Knott County, and, in the year and a half that followed,
shovels, bulldozers, trucks, and other equipment at several other
Knott and Perry County operations were destroyed under cover of
night.9
Counseling against the use of “violence,” but assisting coal-
field residents in a variety of important and critical ways, were
anti-poverty activists, most of them not from Appalachia. Initially
they were college students sponsored by the Council of Southern
Mountains, doing service projects like painting one-room school-
houses, very much in line with a long history of well-meaning
outsiders who came to the region to help the supposedly isolated
mountaineers. By the summer of 1965, however, the anti-poverty
workers were part of the War on Poverty, most employed through
the Office of Economic Opportunity’s (OEO) Volunteers in
Service to America (VISTA) program, a few others placed by the
Southern Conference Education Fund (SCEF), and they shifted to
community organizing, taking literally the OEO’s mandate to
encourage “maximum feasible participation of the poor.” Until
Kentucky VISTA funding was cut in the wake of the Jink Ray
protest, the young activists helped AGSLP with research, press
releases, strip mine tours, as well as publishing regular issues of
“Strip Mining BULLETIN,” distributed to over 4000 people.
Meanwhile, people in other parts of Appalachia built on
years of dealing with under-regulated and laxly enforced strip-
ping, organized their own campaigns for a ban. With the help of
anti-poverty workers, for example, West Virginia activists formed
the Citizens Task Force on Surface Mining and, later in 1971,
Citizens to Abolish Coal Mining (CASM). These efforts had sup-
port throughout the state, although the strongest base was
undoubtedly in Fayette, Raleigh, and Boone counties, where mil-
itant mineworkers were already engaged in a battle with their cor-
rupt union leadership and immersed in an epic fight to call atten-
tion to black lung. They understood the threat stripping posed not
only to the hills and streams where they lived but also to their
jobs. Despite mineworker involvement, however, CASM was ulti-
mately thwarted by the coal industry’s divisive rhetoric, pitting
jobs against environment, and by its control over the House of
Delegates and Senate, which made legislators primarily account-
able to operators and equipment suppliers. When this happened,
CASM closed up shop and its leadership helped nurture a region-
wide initiative that would work toward redress at the national
level. 
In line with the new approach, in October 1971, at a meeting
in Huntington, West Virginia, representatives from various groups
gathered and established the Appalachian Coalition, dedicated to
achieving a ban on stripping by federal law. They chose a very
outspoken and brash activist, Jim Branscome, as the coalition’s
lead coordinator, and they made Richard Cartwright Austin,
CASM’s former head and much more reserved in manner, the
new organization’s secretary. Later that fall, a number of main-
stream environmental groups, namely the Sierra Club and Friends
of the Earth, also joined forces to establish the National Coalition
Against Strip Mining (NCASM), which was not strictly aboli-
tionist in its outlook or goals. NACSM pledged to work with the
Coalition to lobby members of Congress and arrange effective
testimony at hearings, but its formation was the beginning of an
ominous division within the movement.
The United Mine Workers underwent some big changes too,
with equally important implications for the stripping struggle.
Control of the union had passed from John Lewis to Tony Boyle
in the early 1960s, after which it became anything but responsive
to the membership, often colluding with coal operators to negoti-
ate “sweetheart” contracts as well as to block meaningful health
and safety legislation. When Boyle hired thugs to murder his
opponent in the 1969 election for president, mineworkers in
southern West Virginia formed Miners for Democracy. They
chose Arnold Miller, a Black Lung Association leader as well as
an advocate for banning stripping, to run in the 1972 election,
which he won. But with a growing surface mining membership in
the UMW, Miller had to hedge on abolition and put the union
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behind strong regulatory legislation. 
For coalfield residents throughout southern Appalachia, the
main argument against stripping was the threat it posed to the
land and people. In particular, they objected to its infringement on
the rights of small property owners (ruined gardens and orchards,
dried up wells, cracked foundations, flyrock missiles in the air)
and the way it eroded what remained of mining employment in
the region (since surface methods were much more efficient than
underground methods). Framing these concerns, as well as pro-
viding legitimacy for resistance, was a tradition of natural rights,
elaborated by John Locke and enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence by Thomas Jefferson. This tradition established
rights like life, liberty, and property as inherent and inalienable,
not privileges granted by a monarch or any other authority, and it
defined the purpose of government as protecting these rights,
granting people the right to alter or abolish the government when
it failed in this primary purpose. Faced with the tyranny of the
coal industry, which had taken over their legislatures and courts,
Dan Gibson, Bessie Smith, Madge Ashley, and others believed
they were duty-bound to act, and justified in acting outside of the
law. 
In fact, it was the spreading uprising in the coalfields that
forced operators and trade groups to shift their position on control
laws. Initially, they claimed that any regulations would be the coal
industry’s death knell, and some tried to fight all attempts at
change, but once local people began pressing for a state ban, state
regulations became more attractive. Friends of the coal industry
in West Virginia’s legislature, for instance, saved surface mining
only by agreeing to a temporary two-year halt on all stripping in
the state’s twenty-two still unmined counties. The final law also
increased performance bonds (forfeited by negligent operators),
required the construction of approved drainage systems, and man-
dated delayed blasting techniques. On paper, this seemed like the
Assembly was getting tough with the industry. Perhaps indicative
of the weakness of the legislation and its expected inadequate
enforcement, however, the president of the West Virginia Surface
Mining Association praised it as “fair and equitable.” While sign-
ing the bill, Governor Moore suggested that, considering “the
times and temper,” the new control act was a good one.10
After West Virginia Congressman Ken Hechler introduced
the first bill to outlaw stripping at the national level, in February
1971, weak federal regulations earned a new appeal as well. The
American Mining Congress “will urge the adoption of realistic
surface mining regulation at the state level and will support fed-
eral surface mining legislation which is realistically designed to
assist the states and the surface mining industry in conducting
surface mining operations,” the trade industry explained in a
statement. “From State-to-State, from place-to-place, it can well
be said of mining that its only constant is its diversity,” insisted
AMC chair Joseph Abdnor. “All such diverse realities of mining,”
he said, “argue eloquently against any effort to devise other than
broad, reasonable Federal guidelines.” Yet industry representa-
tives made a point to argue against outlawing surface coal mining.
Reclamation was possible, said National Coal Association
President Carl Bagge, whereas prohibition “would have disas-
trous results for the Nation and its constantly increasing need for
energy.”11
Despite the connection between direct action, demand for a
ban, and the coal industry’s steady retreat, the groups that made
up the Appalachian Coalition began to focus their attention on
lobbying lawmakers. In fact, the last organized, nonviolent civil
disobedience against strip mining for almost thirty years hap-
pened in eastern Kentucky in 1972. In the first protest, more than
twenty women occupied a Sigmon Brothers strip operation in
Knott County from early morning to late at night, periodically
harassed by rock-throwing workers, who also beat up men wait-
ing in support at the company gate below. When a state trooper
came up to let the women know that the men had left for a hospi-
tal (chased part of the way by strippers), they decided to end the
protest, and found their cars with busted windows, slashed tires,
as well as one that was overturned.12 Later, following spring
floods that killed one person and damaged countless homes, gar-
dens, bridges, and roads in Floyd County, activists temporarily
shut down a strip mine there as well, blaming the operation for
causing unusual run-off. Following that, however, in a strategic
miscalculation, opposition to stripping in the southern coalfields
largely took the form of writing to members of Congress and
sending delegations to provide testimony at hearings.
In line with their modified tactics, the formerly militant
activists did what they could to find and connect with allies out-
side of Appalachia, particularly mainstream environmental
groups. Their two main contacts were Louise Dunlap, first at
Friends of the Earth and then at the Environmental Policy Center,
and Peter Borelli, the Sierra Club’s eastern representative. Dunlap
started and coordinated NCASM and, with Borelli, they drew on
the pressure mountain people could bring to bear in Washington,
D.C., but not toward the end of abolition. While people like J.W.
Bradley (later head of Tennessee’s Save Our Cumberland
Mountains) called for “stopping strip mining as soon as possible,”
and invoked the Declaration of Independence as a warning that
people would take matters into their own hands if Congress failed
to protect their inalienable rights, the professional environmental-
ists took a hard line only as a foil to win federal regulation.13
“Though no one seriously expects [the abolition bills] to win
committee approval,” Borelli wrote in the Sierra Club Bulletin,
“the abolitionists and their legions have been the first to budge
these traditionally mineral-oriented committees. As a result, sev-
eral milder but potentially effective measures that might other-
wise have been ignored have earned some credibility.”14
After a couple more years of hearings, Dunlap and Borelli
began to make no pretense about supporting a ban and talked
instead about “minimum requirements” that they expected to see
in any final regulatory legislation.15 Consequently, with the ‘envi-
ronmental lobby’ backing off, support in Congress for a bill to
ban stripping began to erode. Representative Hechler responded
in frustration, yet he began to waver too. “My people in West
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Virginia and people throughout the nation,” he wrote to activists
in January 1975, “are getting more and more cynical about com-
promising politicians, Washington environmental groups who set-
tle for the lowest common denominator, and those who enjoy the
transient glory of winning a few commas or semi-colons while
the people and the land continue to be exploited and destroyed.”
But while Hechler encouraged support for his recently introduced
abolition bill, he also noted the importance of defining “the min-
imum standards you would accept in a regulatory bill.” These
included a ban on steep slopes (greater than twenty degrees), no
mountaintop removal, prohibition of mining in alluvial valley
floors, a ban on impoundments for coal waste disposal, and writ-
ten consent of surface owners in all cases where surface and min-
eral rights had been separated.16
Like members of Congress, once coal trade groups, coal
companies, and energy conglomerates saw the movement’s
decline, they retreated too. After President Ford twice vetoed
weak control bills, in 1974 and 1975, their agenda went back to
opposing any federal oversight. The American Mining Congress
(AMC) declared that uniform national standards for surface min-
ing and reclamation were “not feasible” and insisted that regula-
tion was best handled at the state level. Anything like the meas-
ures just vetoed, it said, would create “a virtual prohibition on
surface mining through the imposition of unrealistic and unwork-
able provisions.”17 Peabody Coal President Edwin Phelps voiced
a similar sentiment. “All major coal producing States have their
own functioning programs that regulate surface mining and
required sound reclamation,” he explained. “The debate that has
raged over this issue has outlived the need for Federal legisla-
tion.”18
The United Mine Workers moved back to support for state-
level regulation of stripping as well. Echoing industry concerns, a
sizable number of delegates to the 47th constitutional convention
argued that a federal law would not recognize the problems and
conditions specific to various regions, and the union’s president
fell into line. “What works in the hills of West Virginia may not
work in the plains of Illinois,” Miller explained, “some reclama-
tion standards that would benefit one area could possibly harm
another.” Surface mining and reclamation were both important to
the economy and ecology of the country, he said, and protecting
the environment was vital “not only for ourselves but more for the
use of our children and our children’s children.” The UMW would
cease working for legislation to establish federal standards and
enforcement, however, and instead work for reclamation laws on
a state-by-state basis. This position, dictated in part by the grow-
ing influence of surface miners in the union, was largely an effort
to shore up coalfield employment. The co-chair of the committee
making the recommendation explained that a state-by-state
approach was needed “so that we will not put anyone out of
work.”19
In 1977, Congress enacted and President Carter signed fed-
eral legislation, although it was not too far from what the coal
industry and UMW wanted at that point. The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) set up a federal-state
partnership for oversight, giving most duties to state agencies in
good standing, and it was nearly as weak as any bill considered
since the start of hearings in 1968. It created an Office of Surface
Mining, included a ban against dumping overburden on steep
slopes, established an abandoned mine reclamation program
funded by a per-ton tax on coal, and empowered citizens to sue
negligent regulatory agencies. Yet the law lacked many of the pro-
visions surface mining opponents had called for when outlining
their own version of a strong bill. SMCRA allowed stripping on
steep slopes and alluvial valley floors, said nothing about coal
reserves owned separate from the surface without surface owner
consent (except federally owned land), and permitted mountain-
top removal (with an allowance for a variance from restoration of
slopes to approximate original contour) as well as impoundments
for slurry waste. 
As meager as the law was, the coal industry and its allies in
Congress immediately went on the attack to undermine its imple-
mentation. OSM’s operating funds were stalled for several
months, delaying hiring and opening field offices, and the Senate
held hearings to investigate industry claims that regulations were
confusing and too burdensome. By the spring of 1978, operators
also had initiated over 100 legal challenges to SMCRA in more
than fifteen separate law suits. None of this led to modifications
in the law, but it was a shot across the bow, so to speak, and a por-
tent of things to come. SMCRA legalized the destruction caused
by strip mining and, in practice, it did little if anything to force
companies to shoulder responsibility for what had been and con-
tinued to be regarded as ‘externalities’ (ruined land, polluted
water, and unemployment). Still, over the next couple of decades,
operators persistently tried to undermine even the few provisions
in the law which seemed to enhance regulatory power.
In the immediate post-SMCRA era, activism against strip-
ping did not stop, but it did change, increasingly attending to land
monopoly and tax inequity, an agenda which had considerable
potential to revive a struggle with competing claims for power at
its center. Just before the new control law was enacted, eastern
Kentucky and southern West Virginia were struck by flooding,
caused by heavy rains made much worse by rapid runoff and silt
loads from strip mines. Those left homeless found their plight
compounded by lack of available land for resettlement, with trail-
ers for emergency housing standing empty on the road because
land and coal companies refused to lease or sell property overly-
ing coal they might want to mine later. Sufficiently incited in the
months that followed, residents of Martin and Harlan counties in
Kentucky, established several community groups to help people
in the flood’s aftermath and to demand an end to stripping in their
area. Across the state border, in Mingo County, West Virginia, the
same issues led to formation of the Appalachian Alliance, to “sup-
port individuals and communities which are working to gain dem-
ocratic control over their lives, workplaces, and natural
resources.”20
A year later, in 1978, the Alliance created a Task Force on
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Land Ownership to study links between land and mineral owner-
ship, property taxes, and poverty in the region, and the Martin and
Harlan County activists were involved in the part that dealt with
eastern Kentucky. They found startling statistics, like the
Pocahontas-Kentucky Corporation’s $76 annual property tax pay-
ment on $7 million-worth of coal reserves in Martin County.
Subsequently, in 1981, they established the Kentucky Fair Tax
Coalition, which pushed for an increase in the unmined minerals
tax and, when that failed, challenged the systematic underassess-
ment of mineral property.21 In the meantime, the group trans-
formed itself into a membership organization with local chapters,
changed its name to Kentuckians for the Commonwealth
(KFTC), and expanded its agenda to include the broad form deed.
As a result of unrelenting grassroots mobilization across the state,
by the early 1990s, KFTC had not only forced the Revenue
Cabinet to adequately assess unmined minerals, significantly
increasing taxes land and coal companies paid, but also amended
the state constitution to require strippers to get surface owner con-
sent before mining.22
Gradually, though, the fight against strip mining devolved
into a mainstream environmental reform campaign, concerned
primarily with better enforcement of SMCRA and the Clean
Water Act, and lacking any commitment to confrontational tac-
tics. What happened at Save Our Cumberland Mountains is
instructive. The group had its origins in the 1960s and 1970s
efforts to abolish strip mining, following failed state regulatory
efforts, wanton destruction of surface owners’ property by miner-
al owners working on a broad form deed, and persistent poverty
in seemingly mineral-rich coal counties. Leading the organiza-
tion, from 1972 to 1977, was the outspoken and unwavering J.W.
Bradley, a former deep miner who had been forced off his land by
the Shemco Coal Company a couple of years before for interfer-
ing with a strip operation. He once described efforts by the feder-
al government to regulate surface coal mining as “short-sighted,
unrealistic, and a waste of time,” and that seemed to be SOCM’s
position, at least until 1975. On the eve of SMCRA’s enactment,
however, there was a definite split in the group’s membership,
with some favoring federal legislation as a small step forward and
others holding out for what they saw as the only real solution.23
When abolitionists lost the argument, Bradley stepped down
as president and SOCM morphed into a watchdog of the state and
federal regulatory agencies (eventually the Division of Surface
Mining lost primacy for inadequate enforcement and the OSM
took over entirely). During the years 1978 to 1980, wildcat
(unpermitted) operations spread throughout East Tennessee and
the homes of several activists were burned, very likely retaliatory
acts of arson.24 By the mid-1980s, though, SOCM had settled into
a comfortable role filing lawsuits, lobbying legislators, as well as
pushing OSM to improve regulatory standards and do better
enforcement. Consequently, the organization stopped being a cat-
alyst for community organizing and increasingly focused on
expert intervention, which did little to stop the destruction of
mountains and communities. 
While the opponents of strip mining stumbled, extraction
methods evolved beyond the familiar area, contour and auger
operations. More and more operators in eastern Kentucky, south-
ern West Virginia, and East Tennessee engaged in what was called
“mountaintop removal” (MTR), an exceptionally efficient way to
get at usually horizontal Appalachian coal seams. The process not
only included leveling mountains and destroying the hardwood
forests they sustained, but also dumping overburden in huge val-
ley fills, burying miles and miles of streams, and building massive
slurry ponds to hold millions of gallons of wastewater from wash-
ing tons of coal, putting whole communities in jeopardy from dis-
astrous, toxic floods.25 Of course, MTR ate away at the remaining
mining jobs in the region as well, allowing for record-high levels
of production and record-low levels of employment.
When Congress passed SMCRA, most of its supporters had
assumed that mountaintop removal would occur only infrequent-
ly, in rare circumstances. And perhaps that explains why the law’s
provisions defining reclamation after a mountaintop operation are
so vague. Operators are required to reclaim the land so that it
“closely resembles the general surface configuration of the land
prior to mining,” or the “approximate original contour” (AOC).
This standard could make mountaintop removal mining com-
pletely impractical in places like eastern Kentucky and southern
West Virginia, where grades often exceed twenty degrees. But it
has not been interpreted that way by coal companies and regula-
tory officials contend their hands are tied because nobody agrees
what AOC really means. SMCRA does allow some exemptions to
the standard, if operators submit detailed plans for development
of schools, factories, or public parks before permit approval. Yet
regulators have failed to require even that much of operators and
the most popular post-mining land uses proposed and approved
by regulatory agencies are “fish and wildlife habitat” and “tim-
berland.”26
Resurgence
By the twentieth anniversary of SMCRA, even Louise
Dunlap admitted that the federal-state regulatory program estab-
lished by the law had failed. She still believed SMCRA itself was
“sound,” but cited less than enthusiastic commitment by the
White House and Department of Interior. “Even in the worst-case
scenario,” Dunlap explained, “I expected the Act to be enforced
better than it’s been.”27 Yet that had been the abolitionists’ point
all along, based on the experience they had with a coal industry
capturing regulatory agencies or at least significantly influencing
implementation of regulations. The battle that had raged back in
the 1960s and 1970s was about the technical feasibility of strip
mining and reclamation for some, but for others it was about the
imbalance of power, along with the interest coal companies and
energy conglomerates had in making a profit, which they believed
doomed any control effort from the start. Louise Dunlap never
accepted that, KFTC and SOCM seemed to forget it, and new
organizations like the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition,
formed in 1987, missed the point altogether. By the end of the
1990s, in fact, the campaign targeting strip mining put little or no
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emphasis on the idea that legislatures, courts, Congress, and reg-
ulatory agencies were irredeemably corrupt, and it ceased being a
running confrontation with the coal industry and individual oper-
ators. 
There has since been a rebirth of militancy, however,
activism marked by a clarity about the links between the environ-
mental and economic costs of surface coal mining, the imbalance
of power that undermined even the most well-meant efforts to
control it, and the need to use a variety of tactics, including non-
violent civil disobedience. Groups like Coal River Mountain
Watch, formed by residents of Whitesveille, West Virginia, in
1998, are resolutely opposed to mountaintop removal and they
have been steadily organizing the local community to hold the
line against the Massey Energy Company. In 2004, they were
joined by another group of activists, loosely affiliated as
Mountain Justice, who set up organizing houses throughout
Appalachia. From these centers the mostly young participants
have done ‘listening projects’ and outreach, initiated marches and
rallies, and planned direct actions, like lockdowns and sit-ins. At
the same time, more exceptionally blunt and forthright leaders
have emerged within established organizations like Kentuckians
for the Commonwealth, including Teri Blanton and Maria Gunoe,
who have a personal experience with strip mining and are increas-
ingly frustrated with giving coal companies and regulators any
benefit of the doubt. They have begun to work with Mountain
Justice activists, encouraging them to seed an uprising in the coal-
fields, and that seems to be what is happening. 
There have been questions about the new activism from some
corners, to be sure, particularly for the way it can alienate politi-
cians, regulatory officials, and hesitant or fearful mountain resi-
dents. Some mainstream activists continue to insist that SMCRA
and other control laws are part of a gradual encroachment on the
coal industry’s control over political systems, economic develop-
ment, and the natural environment, affording at least some if not
completely adequate tools for protecting hills, streams, forests,
and wildlife. But anyone sitting through a permit hearing these
days could easily call that conclusion into question, since the pro-
cedure is so obviously designed to strictly limit discussion and
thinking about surface mining, and to suggest by the end that due
process has been offered and carried out. It is tempting, in fact, to
think that the whole procedure is a waste of time, and might as
well not happen at all. Getting a brief glimpse of the past, when
environmental injustice in the coalfields was met with determined
resistance and opened up a larger struggle over the balance of
power, also brings that kind of clarity to our understanding of the
present.
Chad Montrie is an associate professor of History at the
University of Massachusetts Lowell. His most recent book is
Making a Living: Work and Environment in the United States
(University of North Caroline Press, 2008).
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Most American cities of the Progressive Era chose to avoid the
costs of building two separate sewer systems for wastewater and
stormwater, and instead constructed one combined system to con-
vey both flows to waterways, sans treatment. Following four
decades of municipal water-line installation, the Commissioners of
Sewerage of Louisville (Kentucky) was empowered to build sewers
early in the 20th Century. Unlike most of its counterparts,
Louisville responded to recurring disease epidemics by opting to
install separate sewer systems to protect water quality in Beargrass
Creek. However, obstacles chronically undermined the efforts of
commission engineers to protect the public that swam, waded and
fished there. Wildcat plumbers took advantage of weak enforce-
ment and installed illegal cross-connections: “soil pipes” tapped
into storm sewers continued to contaminate the creek, and gutters
and downspouts overflowed sanitary sewers into basements and the
stream. Elected officials’ unwillingness to impose fees on voters
and voters’ reluctance to approve bond issues meant that funding
came up far short of that required for the infrastructure that they
demanded. And the city allowed, encouraged even, developers to
continue building new neighborhoods, most well beyond the reach
of infrastructure. As the commission fell further behind, it ultimate-
ly abandoned its health-based policy and switched to constructing
only combined sewers—in retrospect a regrettable decision that
will burden water quality and community coffers for decades to
come, until combined sewer overflows are adequately mitigated.
Still, the story of these forward-thinking engineers deserves to be
told. 
Introduction
The disposal of human wastes in
19th-century urban America was haphaz-
ard, unsanitary and unpleasant. Some
households merely tossed sewage onto
the ground while others dumped it into
cesspools (holes filled with crushed rock,
also known as dry wells or seepage pits)1,
but most city dwellers relied on privy
vaults—earthen pits inside cellars or
backyard outhouses—that were not water
tight.2 Privies reeked of nauseating odors,
and methane gas posed a special danger
to smokers.3 The proximity of these nox-
ious privies to homes was seen as unhealthy because they “use[d]
up the oxygen from the air” and “load[ed] it with pestilential
gases.”4 They also leaked into and polluted groundwater, wells and
cisterns. In his 1899 annual report, Louisville’s Health Officer
wrote, “That many of public wells are contaminated by our privy
vault system can not be questioned.”5
Privies overflowed or had to be covered over, abandoned and
replaced, unless emptied at least annually. That dirty job was done
by private contractors, often African Americans, called tubmen,6 or
night men, because stirring those repugnant odors was relegated to
when nearly everyone else slept. Tubmen used hand tools to exca-
vate wet “night soil” into buckets and tubs, and then loaded them
onto leaky wagons and hauled them to nearby water bodies, open
land on the outskirts of town, farm acreage or fertilizer factories—
leaving an infectious trail along their routes. The widespread failure
of the privy vault system began with the pressures of urban crowd-
ing, and was completed by the introductions of running water and
the indoor water closet or flush toilet.7
Municipalities constructed potable water systems to supply
businesses and households, fight fires and wash down streets.
Because this urban utility was infinitely more convenient and sani-
tary than outdoor hand-pumps, customers who could afford to pay
for it eagerly tapped into its distribution lines. By 1860, municipal-
ly-supplied water flowed in 136 US cities, including Louisville; by
1880, that number had more than quadrupled to 598 communities.
With access to water, per-capita consumption and installations of
toilets grew exponentially. However, most flush toilets were
plumbed to empty into privies or cesspools, which rapidly over-
flowed into cellars and backyards, and from there into alleys and
streets.8 One leading engineer complained of the “steady growth
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[of] the ‘modern conveniences’ scattered throughout the house by
the profuse hand of the plumber, with no regard to the effect on the
atmosphere of the dwelling.”9
And while hundreds of cities constructed waterworks and dis-
tribution lines—that paradoxically magnified the contaminating
reach of sewage—none coincidentally built sewer systems, much
less wastewater treatment facilities. None of the approximately six
hundred US cities operating water distribution systems in the 1880s
had comparable sewer systems. Even when American cities began
installing sewers, the impetus was not to improve sanitation, but to
“prevent the flooding or dampness of cellars, and the obstruction of
traffic by the accumulation of storm-water” after heavy storms. And
cities expanded the reach of their water service pipes with little
regard for any negative impacts on downstream neighbors.10
Poor sanitation coupled with Louisville’s location along the
Ohio River created extensive stagnant swamplands—and mosquito
breeding. Sewage commonly contaminated those sloughs, as well
as the stream and well water that most residents drank. Successive
deadly epidemics of cholera, yellow fever, malaria, typhoid fever
and dysentery throughout the 19th century earned the town the
nickname, “Graveyard of the West.” The city appointed its first
health officers in 1823 and authorized its first Board of Health in
1865. Only 19 of the other 133 US cities of 30,000 or more resi-
dents surpassed Louisville’s average rate of 60 deaths per year from
typhoid fever during 1898-1900—when a rate of more than 15 to 20
belied polluted water. Water-borne typhoid fever and the “Saffron
Scourge” continued to plague Louisville at rates above national
norms into the 20th century.11
That engineers and medical doctors espoused a pair of perva-
sive misconceptions even after science disproved them, hampered
municipal responses to these epidemics, nationally and locally.
These professionals believed that dirt and miasmas—vapors and
foul odors from sewage, filth and decaying matter—caused sick-
ness.12 The habits of foreigners and the poor—crowded into tene-
ments with the highest concentrations of side-by-side privies and
wells—were often singled out as “filthy” and blamed for spreading
diseases—even in communities discharging sewage above down-
stream community’s water intake pipes.13 Sanitary engineers identi-
fied themselves as the “scientific scavenger” charged with keeping
the air “pure,” by “removing all garbage, and by carrying out a
proper system of drainage and sewerage.”14 And the “purifying
nature” of moving water was seen as capable of cleansing all impu-
rities that industrial era cities and factories dumped into it.15
Because mosquitoes transmitted yellow fever and malaria, these
early sewers—built to drain rainwater from streets and stagnant
water from low-lying ground—eradicated breeding pools and
reduced those diseases’ transmission rates, albeit while also perpet-
uating the miasma myth.16
Design Debates
The first generation of sanitary engineers grappling with how best
to manage sewage, considered two options to privies: pneumatic
ejector and water carriage systems, using vacuum pressure and
water, respectively, to evacuate or flush and then transport sewage.17
Complicated, relatively unreliable and expensive, the former was
soon dropped from serious consideration.18 The water-carriage sys-
tem, developed mid-century in Europe,19 had drawbacks, too. 
Large quantities of water were required to convey everything
from household bath water and toilet flushes to slaughterhouse
blood and grease to toxic industrial wastes into the nearest water
body, which often “bec[a]me an elongated, open cess-pool of the
worst variety.”20 The more enlightened medical doctors of the day
warned of spreading disease downstream, while chemists and farm-
ers complained about the loss of fertilizer. Sewers also shifted the
financial and maintenance responsibilities for sewage removal from
individual property owners to municipalities.21
However, the demands of a public eager to flush its bodily
wastes out of sight and out of mind easily drowned those concerns.
Most physicians and sanitarians saw sewers as providing significant
reductions in the incidence of typhoid fever and other infectious
diseases. And by significantly reducing foul odors, disease and
sewage overflows, industrialists and elected officials saw sewers as
good for property values, as well as a city’s business climate and
image, particularly in the South where the higher incidence of
infectious diseases hampered growth and development.
Consequently, despite few mechanisms for financing sewers—
bonds, special assessments, such as one-time connection fees, and
general revenues, all viewed skeptically by fee-adverse property
owners—water and sewer infrastructure projects were 19th century
cities’ biggest capital investments.22
But municipalities could not install water-carriage systems
without wrestling through the debate between two very different
designs: A combined sewer system is a single network of large-
diameter pipes designed to carry “all sewage matter, slops, rain
water from roofs, roads,” etc. A separate system consists of dual
networks of pipes: smaller-diameter for “all foul matters and liq-
uids,” (also called sanitary waste), and larger-diameter for “the
removal of storm-water direct to the nearest natural outlet or water
course.”23 All sewers in the U.S. were combined, until Lenox,
Massachusetts, built the first separate sewer system in 1875-1876.24
Until the 20th century development of wastewater treatment
processes, both systems only transferred local sewage hazards to
wider swaths of downstream neighborhoods or communities. These
deliberations in the late-19th and early-20th centuries tended to
focus on least costs.25
In the late-19th century, most engineers accepted the views of
sanitary engineer Rudolph Hering, whose analysis of numerous
European sewer systems of various designs was published by the
National Board of Health in 1882. Hering concluded that all
designs were capable of improving sanitation and that municipali-
ties could choose according to their site-based installation and
maintenance costs. Though he regularly professed objectivity, his
arguments showed a strong preference for combined sewers:26
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Separate sewers would provide no significant benefit over
combined sewers as long as storms washed contamination from
streets littered with horse manure and rubbish “as foul as ordinary
sewage” into streams. If storm sewers were required to remove
urban storm run-off, the cost of building them slightly bigger to
accommodate comparatively small quantities of wastewater would
be negligible. Sewers big enough for workers to enter would be eas-
ier and cheaper to maintain. Having two systems increased the risks
that plumbers could mistakenly make connections “to the wrong
sewer,” defeating the primary value of a separate system.27
After untreated sewage undeniably overwhelmed a growing
number of streams’ self-cleansing abilities, some engineers advo-
cated that cities control disease by filtering drinking water. In his
1907 book, Clean Water and How to Get It, engineer Allen Hazen
pointed out that, “To protect the water supply of Louisville, it would
be necessary to purify the sewage of Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and hun-
dreds of smaller cities upon the Ohio River and its tributaries.” He
concluded that, “Looking at the whole matter as one great engi-
neering problem, it is clearly and unmistakably better to purify the
water supplies taken from the rivers than to purify the sewage
before it is discharged into them.”28
Other engineers, equally confident of the germ theory and the
etiologies of water-borne diseases, argued for separate sewers.
Scientists began taking samples from various locations, analyzing
them for specific pollutants and plotting the results onto maps to
show underground movement of polluted water from privy vaults
and cesspools to water wells. Health agencies began collecting data
on the causes of death; early epidemiological studies demonstrated
connections between contaminated wells and typhoid and cholera.
Later analyses showed incremental declines in water-borne diseases
after the installation of municipal drinking water and, later, sewers.
These engineers also saw combined sewers as too big to keep
sewage moving during dry periods, yet too small to handle the
heaviest storms. Lastly, they considered odor control an insur-
mountable challenge in cavernous combined sewers.29
Perhaps the best known sanitarian in that critical time was
Colonel George E. Waring, Jr., who was not an engineer, but an
agriculturalist with engineering work experience. From his work for
Frederick Law Olmsted—the charismatic pioneer of American
landscape architecture who convinced city leaders to set aside
prime real estate for public parks—Waring learned to parlay his
personality to persuade others to his way of thinking. His articles
employed flamboyant language, and were published in popular
magazines, such as Atlantic Monthly, as well as trade journals.
After constructing the separate sewers in Lenox, he submitted a
$200,000 bid to build a similar system in Memphis, Tennessee,
after an especially deadly epidemic of yellow fever. With only
$368,702 raised through a special tax to spend, the city chose
Waring’s proposal over the $1,000,000 bid from a pair of engineers,
one of whom was Charles Hermany of Louisville. Waring used the
drop in Memphis’ yellow fever rates following construction of the
sewers to widely promote his design. However, his atypical
design—under-sized pipes and substitution of lamp holes for man
holes—only added to the controversy within the engineering pro-
fession.30
Waring’s lack of formal training only added to many engineers’
reluctance to take the risks that they associated with selling separate
sewer designs to their municipal clients. Leonard Metcalf and
Harrison Eddy, leading sanitary engineers of the early-20th centu-
ry, wrote the influential three-volume design manual, American
Sewerage Practice—updated editions of which are still used by
engineers today. In their first chapter, entitled, “The Lessons Taught
by Early Sewerage Works,” (Volume I—Design of Sewers, pub-
lished in 1914), they bemoaned the fact that, “American sewerage
practice is noteworthy among the branches of engineering for the
preponderating influence of experience rather than experiment
upon [its] development . . .”31
Through the first decade of the 20th century, the type of sewer
system selected by municipalities strongly correlated with the city’s
size: smaller cities typically installed separate sewers, supplement-
ed with surface drainage piping. However, greater concentrations of
impervious surface—and thus stormwater runoff—led cities of
more than 100,000 residents to build combined sewers by a seven-
to-one margin. Because health officials in most states failed to per-
suade municipal decision-makers to see combined sewers as uni-
versal threats to public health until the 1920s and 1930s, most US
cities ended up with some of both types of sewers, i.e., combined in
older areas and separate in more recently sewered areas.32 
But as cities expanded, so did the sanitary design challenges.
Increasing concentrations of rooftops, paved streets, sidewalks and,
eventually, parking lots necessitated more drainage, as more streets
flooded. Worse, runoff-filled sewers increasingly back-flowed into
basements—creating significant health risks, political liabilities and
costly damage claims, prompting cities to construct two new types
of sewers: “Relief sewers” ran alongside older sewers to convey
excess wet-weather flow. Inside periodic junction boxes, semi-par-
titions between the original and relief sewers kept smaller, dry-
weather flows in the original sewer, yet allowed voluminous, wet-
weather flows to leap over the partition into the relief sewer. To fur-
ther reduce the risks of back-ups, these sewers had “regulators,”
overflow outlets now called combined sewer overflows (CSOs),
allowing excess stormwater and sewage to flow into the nearest
water body. “Interceptor sewers” redirected flows in stream-bound
sewers, initially away from smaller and into larger streams and,
later, away from streams and into treatment facilities. However, reg-
ulators emptied excess interceptor flow into receiving streams,
rather than basements.33
While the installation of sewers reduced the local incidence of
certain diseases, the public health benefits of sewerization were not
reaped universally. Business districts and more affluent areas of
town often off-loaded their sewage to lower-lying, less affluent
areas. Similarly, upstream cities shifted their sewage to downstream
cities. Besides damaging downstream drinking water supplies, sew-
ers also commonly damaged the industrial utility and recreational
value of receiving waters.34
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Looking back on these debates, historians have seen those
advocating separate systems as having the strongest argument from
the perspective of public health. Yet most cities opted for combined
systems, an option that historians have tended to argue was based
on least costs. A study of Louisville’s history of sewer construction
complicates this story.
The Louisville Story
Louisville generally followed this pattern. Like the rest of the
nation, it first built sewers, not to remove disease risks from resi-
dential areas, but to drain stormwater from its business district,35 as
well as ponds that served as garbage dumps, attracted pigs and bred
the mosquitoes that carried malaria and typhoid fever.36
The city’s earliest attempts to provide municipal drinking
water in the1830s failed due to consumer resistance. Before germs
became commonly understood, Louisvillians tended to assume that
their well water was potable as long as it was palatable and looked
reasonably clean after the mud settled. Only after several fires in the
business district and a promise to leave free corner wells in place,
did the Kentucky legislature authorize the Louisville Water
Company’s creation in 1854. When city water first flowed in 1860,
the initial customers were chiefly businesses, including such large
consumers as public baths, hospitals, restaurants and a paper mill.
Far into the 20th century, most residents preferred the free water
from their wells to paying for city water,37 even though fewer than
two miles of storm sewers existed that year.38
In 1867, the city began constructing sewers to empty into
Beargrass Creek, as well as the Ohio river.39 Beginning in the
1870s, a series of city engineers constructed several large trunk
sewers, including the four-mile-long Western Outfall. By 1880,
only 37 miles of sewers (30 miles per 100,000 residents) served
60% of Louisville’s quadrupled population of nearly 124,000 resi-
dents then liberally consuming city water.40 In 1883, the local
Commercial Club hired Rudolph Hering to do a sanitary survey; he
observed that citizens living along Beargrass Creek suffered more
than their share of typhoid fever.41 By 1900, 100 miles of sewers (49
miles per 100,000 residents) served the still ballooning population
of almost 205,000 residents.42 With more residents consuming city
water and flushing to sewers, the local typhoid death rate began a
slow decline. The graph shows the inverse relationship between
sewer installations and typhoid deaths.43
In his 1898 annual report, Louisville’s Health Officer, M. K.
Allen, said of Beargrass Creek, “the filth poured into it by sewers
and from other sources . . . causes a polluted atmosphere, laden with
disease germs. This stream should be covered over and made into a
sewer.” He predicted that, “When a perfect system of sewerage is
completed we may expect greater immunity from disease of a
malarial type,” and urged that the construction of sewers be “pushed
forward more vigorously, as our city needs very many more.”44 But
due to “lack of funds,” the City of Louisville all but ceased to
extend sewers after 1899—despite continued waves of immigrants
and construction of street-car suburbs beyond the sewershed.
Sewage flowed in curbside gutters, as typhoid death rates hovered
in the mid-50s per 100,000 residents and spiked to 73 per 100,000
in 1903.45 More pavement generated more run-off and basement
and street flooding; contesting damage suits and paying judgments
became costly.46
After voters rejected bond issues to pay for extending sewers
in 1902 and 1904, Mayor Paul C. Barth and other leaders persuad-
ed the Kentucky General Assembly to adopt an act in March, 1906
that enabled the appointment of the Commissioners of Sewerage of
Louisville, and a $4,000,000 bond proposal to go before the voters
that November. In the interim, the promptly appointed commission
hired consulting engineers Samuel M. Gray of Providence, Rhode
Island, and Harrison P. Eddy of Worcester, Massachusetts, to assist
its chief engineer, Joshua B. F. Breed. With the assistance of a sur-
vey team furloughed by the federal government, these engineers
and their staffs immediately began planning sewer projects and pre-
sented their recommendations to the mayor and General Council by
October—before voters went to the polls the following month.
Local newspapers promoted the proposal and, this time, voters
approved the bond issue by a better than two-to-one margin.47
Aware of the challenges of funding Louisville’s immense infra-
structure needs, the engineers reasoned that the flow in the Ohio
River was so large and rapid that the city could indefinitely forego
building a “purification” facili-
ty, and could instead concen-
trate its resources on installing
sewers. Still, they warned of the
inevitability that the federal
government would someday
ban the discharge of wastewater
into navigable waterways, and
proposed to design all new sew-
ers to flow to one outfall on the
Ohio River, to facilitate later
interception and diversion to a
treatment plant.48
The report offered three
options for sewer design, but
recommended the one that
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would, first, protect health by diverting sewage from Beargrass
Creek toward the Ohio River and then solve as many other sewer
and drainage problems as possible with the remaining funds. Given
the expense of rebuilding hundred-plus miles of existing combined
sewers, the commission decided to continue using them and to con-
struct any new sewers draining into them as combined sewers as
well. Similarly, lest the cost of dual systems to serve the neighbor-
hoods furthest from the Ohio river consumed too much funding, it
proposed combined sewers for those areas too. But the commission
proposed separate sewers for the Beargrass Creek sewershed above
Cherokee Park—where the public frequently swam—and for areas
near the river, with prevalent bedrock or slope to allow smaller
diameter sewers.49
Major projects for the city’s south, west and east sides headed
the list of proposed infrastructure. The especially flat South End
lacked sewers and suffered from chronic flooding. Fearing ruinous
groundwater infiltration into a separate sewer deep in chronically
soggy terrain, the commission proposed a combined trunk sewer,
dubbed the Southern Outfall. Because Shawnee Park and other
amusement parks along the river on the city’s west side were “quite
a favorite resort for health and pleasure . . . during the summer
months,” the commission proposed to then redirect the flow dis-
charging from the existing combined Northwestern Outfall to the
downstream Southern Outfall to eliminate “objectionable condi-
tions in the vicinity of [those] parks.” Though it characterized
Beargrass Creek as “an open sewer [and] in many places, a succes-
sion of foul, stagnant ponds,” it rejected calls for covering and turn-
ing it into a sewer. To protect public health, it instead proposed
interceptor sewers along both banks, to divert the flow in existing
sewers to the Ohio River. Lastly, it specified separate sewers to
serve the Letterle Avenue, Brownsboro Road, Mellwood Avenue,
Cherokee Park and Crescent Hill areas, all draining to Beargrass
Creek, near the Ohio River because it was generally hilly and full
of bedrock.50
Though the Mayor and General Council approved the commis-
sion’s plan, court challenges and nationwide financial instabilities
delayed the commencement of construction until January, 1908,
when the commission took on a furious pace, letting 59 contracts in
two years.51 But from its start, demands for better drainage delayed
the agency’s plans. Another major project began the conversion of
the Middle Fork of Beargrass Creek from a shallow, meandering
stream into a deep, concrete-lined engineered channel with vertical
walls, aiming to stop growing volumes of contaminated runoff from
flooding adjacent homes, businesses and railroad tracks.52
The nascent commission’s 1910 report showed that daunting
challenges pushed it further behind: increasing water use over-
loaded older sewers not designed for such volumes. Besides con-
tinued population growth, municipal annexations added new neigh-
borhoods to the service area. Its budget barely paid for a few trunk
and interceptor sewers—and no lateral or collector sewers into
neighborhoods—yet the city continued to build new streets with
neither storm nor sanitary sewers, imposing significantly slower
and more expensive retroactive work on the commission. And as the
The South Fork of Beargrass was originally a mean-
dering stream, here running through Germantown
with St. Therese Catholic Church in the background.
Trying to control flooding, the South Fork of
Beargrass Creek was converted into an engineered
channel, with a dry-weather channel running down its
center.
The South Fork of Beargrass Creek frequently
overflowed its banks, fully submerging the main
Louisville & Nashville rail line. This view is looking
north from Breckinridge Street.
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paved portion of the service area continued to expand and flooding
worsened, the commission issued the following caution regarding
its separate sewers:53
Untiring care will always be necessary to insure the dis-
charge of the sewage from the buildings into the sani-
tary sewers and also to prevent any storm water from
entering them. None of the sanitary sewers are large
enough to accommodate storm water even from very
small areas, and should storm water be allowed to enter
them, flooding of the houses will occur. On the other
hand, the entrance of sewage into the storm drains
might cause a great nuisance in the open creeks into
which they will ultimately discharge.
Pointing out that “fecal matter was visible along the shore . . .
on the Kentucky side,” a 1911 water-quality report proclaimed the
Ohio River “decidedly repulsive” where Louisville’s sewers dis-
charged into it. The mouth of Beargrass Creek “seemed to be boil-
ing, due to septic action,” with its water “thick with black suspend-
ed matter” and its “stench . . . almost unbearable.”54 Voters nonethe-
less rejected a proposed $2 million bond issue in 1912, forcing the
otherwise broke commission out of business in 1913, after laying
54 miles of sewers.55 In a report on its accomplishments, the com-
mission measured its success against the benchmark of typhoid
death rates. While acknowledging reductions due to the August,
1909, start-up of the water company’s filtration system—twenty
months after sewer construction began—its analysis showed a
strong correlation between increased sewers in the ground and
reduced typhoid deaths. As evidence, it cited a Health Department
analysis of all 138 local typhoid cases during the 1910-1911 fiscal
year, fatal or not, and the victims’ water sources and sewage dis-
posal methods: 79% got sick despite drinking filtered city water,
while 73% still relied on open privy vaults.56 
The city sold its Louisville Gas & Electric Company and used
the $1,387,500 in proceeds to allow its Board of Public Works to
continue sewer construction and Beargrass Creek channelization.
That money ran out in 1915, essentially ending sewer construction
until 1919, when voters approved a $2 million bond issue—after
civic and business groups endorsed it, local newspapers published
maps showing streets still relied on privies and advocated air-
dropped promotional literature. The second appointed
Commissioners of Sewerage resumed sewer construction at a fever-
ish pace through the 1920s and 1930s, also with the proceeds of two
more general obligation bonds, for $5 million in 1924 and $10 mil-
lion in 1928.57
27
Allowing homes to be built ahead of sewers meant retro-
fitting, greater costs, longer schedules and nuisances for
residents. This project was at Southern Parkway and
Wellington Avenue in 1929.
Packing houses routinely dumped offal into
Beargrass Creek where it ran through Butchertown.
High water after a snow melt partially collapsed a
bridge constructed to allow dumping on both sides
of the stream."
In 1926, Mayor A. A. Mill, Chief Engineer Joshua B.
F. Breed and other Commissioners of Sewerage offi-
cials pose in the newly completed sewer under 8th
Street and Broadway.
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Proliferating duties cancelled the reincarnated commission’s
successes. By 1921, the city had 285 miles of sewers, but nearly all
were hydraulically overloaded during wet weather, and many areas
were still unsewered. The City Health Officer calculated that
typhoid had cost Louisvillians nearly $14 million over the previous
eighteen years. Population, annexed service area and impervious
surfaces continued to expand, while funding did not. Flooded
streets delayed streetcars and other traffic. Interceptor sewers
extended along Beargrass Creek, but no further than Cherokee Park,
as upstream development marched on. The separate sewers proved
under-sized; designed strictly for residential sewage, they lacked
adequate margin for larger generators such as schools and laun-
dries, for groundwater infiltration through bad joints and for down-
spouts and gutters tapped in “accidentally or surreptitiously.” And
lest the mix back into basements, regulators combined sewer over-
flows to allow excess flow to escape to Beargrass Creek and the
Ohio River, which became routine features of interceptor and relief
sewers.58 In 1923, the City Health Officer declared the creek to be
“an open sewer” and threatened to use dye to identify the responsi-
ble homeowners if necessary to protect children playing in
Cherokee Park, after his inspectors waded along it to confirm the
presence of buried “straight shot” soil pipes.59
In 1924, 46% of the city still lacked sewers.60 The commis-
sion’s 1929 report showed that—despite letting twenty construction
contracts costing $5 million in the previous four years, expanding
the system to 396 miles—competing demands continued to far out-
pace its best efforts to protect public health. Cross connections
abounded, prompting a call for systematic inspection and correc-
tion. Homeowners and especially landlords often ignored an ordi-
nance requiring them to abandon privies and connect to sewers as
soon as they became available. At least ten regulators overflowed
into Beargrass Creek. Admitting a lack of current data on the impact
of Louisville’s sewage on the Ohio River, it proposed periodic
water-quality monitoring. Full-page photos showed flooding in the
South End, including boys in bowery caps standing in thigh-high
water in front of their new homes. Declaring its tasks “obviously
impossible” with only a $10 million bond issue to spend, the com-
mission made its priority combined trunk sewers where none yet
existed.61
The Joint Sanitary Survey and Research Committee, a collab-
oration between health officials and the plumbing industry, organ-
ized itself in 1936 after federal health officials declared that
Louisville’s inordinately high concentration of twelve thousand
privies threatened renewed epidemics. While health inspectors con-
ducted door-to-door inspections—and ordered cross-connections
corrected, septic tank overflow pipes capped and, where sewers
existed, privies surrendered—the trade group promoted the training
and licensure of master plumbers. The health board quickly halved
the privy tally, mainly by ordering sewer connections.62 Still, the
community’s failure to dedicate adequate resources for sanitary
sewers frustrated the Department of Public Health as well. In its
1936-1937 annual report, this body of medical doctors, nurses and
sanitarians responded in strikingly blunt terms:63
In some parts of the city septic tank drainage and par-
tially treated sewage is flowing openly in the street gut-
ters, and is . . . creating a sanitary nuisance and a health
problem of a major character. For this reason outdoor
privies if they were of a sanitary design would in most
cases be preferred to the septic tank . . . The only cor-
rect and permanent solution for these conditions is the
construction of sanitary sewers . . . It is questionable if
this improvement will be brought about for many years
to come because of the extensive expenditures neces-
sary . . . and particularly so because of the large
amounts of money required to construct the combined
system of sewers.
When its money ran out shortly after the nation entered World
War Two, this commission, too, went out of business. Its 1942 final
report was 894 pages of accomplishments, financial accounting,
design manual, operations handbook, preliminary plans for future
projects and raising revenues—and lamentations: Louisville’s 550
miles of sewers were “built piecemeal and inconformity to the
immediate needs and the funds available, rather than [on] compre-
hensive long-range planning.” Neither a treatment facility nor a uni-
fied outfall had been built. The locks and hydroelectric dam com-
A branch of Mill Creek flooded Manitua Avenue, newly
constructed without drainage infrastructure, in 1929.
In 1940, the federal Works Progress Administration paid
day laborers to dig the trench in which the Beals Branch
sewer would be constructed.
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pleted across the river in 1927 created an elevated upper pool, as
well as hydraulic and sanitary problems in the sewers discharging
into it; the mouth of Beargrass Creek stagnated and became
“exceedingly obnoxious and unsanitary.” The 1937 flood did fur-
ther damage. Wet-weather overflows, malfunctioning regulators,
brewery slops, stockyard wash-downs, industrial waste and
“straight-shot” pipes, kept Beargrass Creek unfit for swimming, and
improper connections killed the commitment to separate sewers:64
In general, the Commission’s policy has been to con-
struct combined sewers rather than separate systems.
The principle reason for this is the difficulty of prevent-
ing misuse of the separate system. Experience in
Louisville shows that it is impossible for the city offi-
cials . . . to prevent the connection of some house sew-
ers to the storm drains and connections of some house
drains to the separate sewers. This results (1) in the dis-
charge of dry-weather sewage into the storm drains and
thence into the streams, thereby polluting the streams,
and (2) in the discharge of stormwater into the separate
sewers and thence into the intercepting sewers, thereby
surcharging these sewers. These evils are so objection-
able that, in the opinion of the Commission’s engineers,
use of the separate system in Louisville should be
avoided whenever practicable, in designing sewerage
works. 
Conclusion
Public officials do not always take the easiest or cheapest
route. Despite embracing inaccurate notions about the ability of the
Ohio River to safely absorb sewage pollution, the first
Commissioners of the Sewerage of Louisville were relatively pro-
gressive and more conscious of public-health issues than their peers
in most American cities. A mere six years into the 20th century, they
polled experts and concluded that enough consensus existed to jus-
tify a policy of building separate sewers wherever feasible, plus
some eventual form of wastewater treatment prior to discharge into
the Ohio River. Yet funding foundered, forcing the commission to
divide its attention between retrofitting sanitary and storm sewers
into inhabited areas, improving drainage and constructing sewers in
new street-car suburbs under construction. Worse, the misdeeds and
mistakes of plumbers thwarted commission engineers’ good inten-
tions, forcing them to abandon separate sewers for more expensive
combined sewers, further slowing the extension of service and
adding to stream pollution. Like any public policy, it is only as
effective as its implementation and enforceability. Without taxpay-
er support for adequate funding as well as transparent mechanisms
to ensure good design, proper construction and meaningful regula-
tory enforcement, including protection of whistle blowers, even the
best public policy can in the end come up short.
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Isaac W. Bernheim, a prominent Kentucky capitalist and
philanthropist took the first step toward creating his legacy in
April of 1928 when he purchased thirteen thousand acres of “wild
Kentucky Knob land.”2 With this land he hoped to create a place
of protected nature while preserving the region’s heritage of
hardwood forest. The incorporation of the I.W. Bernheim
Foundation in 1929 set up a self-perpetuating board of directors,
mostly of Louisville businessmen who, by their own admission,
had little expertise in a land management project of this kind.3
The Board was charged with managing the Estate in accordance
with their founder’s wish to provide a place where Kentuckians
“could further their love of the beautiful in nature.”4 From the
very beginning, board members interpreted the founder’s wish
differently and often strayed far afield. Seventy-seven years later
the Bernheim Foundation continues to struggle with balancing
the founder’s recreation-oriented wishes with a modern, more
ecologically based conservation ethic.5 The Foundation’s first two
decades were formative years and took place during the New Deal
era, a watershed in conservation history. 
U.S. historians point to the controversy over creating
Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy dam in 1901 as a defining event in the
conservation movement. It ignited a twelve-year fight between
those who wanted to preserve the natural environment and those
who wanted to convert the Hetch Hetchy Valley into a reservoir to
provide water for public use. Preservationists were interested in
maintaining the aesthetics of untouched wilderness for its own
sake, while conservationists wanted to manage nature for its
utilitarian benefits. During the New Deal era, the federal
government became heavily involved in the growth of outdoor
recreation, signifying a shift in priorities away from Progressive
Era resource conservation.6 The Bernheim Estate was established
during a period of rapid expansion of state and national parks and
forests. Just a little over a decade before I.W. Bernheim purchased
his property in Kentucky, the National Park Service was formed,
the first wilderness area was set aside and prominent utilitarian
foresters began denouncing the Forest Service’s closeness with
the lumber industry. National Parks were created in earnest
shortly after the end of World War I in response to a rise in
automobile ownership and increased leisure time. This trend
intensified in the 1920s as chambers of commerce, and state and
local governments set up commercial enterprises around their
parks and forests to net tourist dollars.7
Debates within the conservation movement over land use
expanded during the interwar years to include questions about
recreation. Historian Paul Sutter argues, in Driven Wild, for the
need to “[rethink] the traditional and historiographical division
between preservationists and conservationists” in environmental
history.8 Sutter observed in his history of the wilderness
movement that preservationists and conservationists were more
united in their concern that recreation-oriented public parks were
undermining the beauty of natural areas through development.
This contention bears out in the history of Bernheim Forest
during the 1930s and 1940s. By the 1950s, the Foundation began
limiting recreation to activities compatible with promoting
environmental stewardship, however, the definition of
‘environmental stewardship’ has changed over time. After the
Second World War, board members and managers adopted an
ecology-oriented strategy that helped align Bernheim Forest’s
recreation, preservation and conservation mission.
As a private sector preservation site, Bernheim Forest was
both influenced by and reacted against what was happening in the
public sphere. Bernheim Forest’s mission developed during the
interwar years in part out of uneasiness over dominant trends in
recreation at public parks rather than as a planned effort in
ecological conservation. 
The broader conservation discourse and government policies
influenced, but did not necessarily determine, the policy decisions
within the Foundation. I.W. Bernheim, board of directors,
technical managers and the public all had their own visions for
the future of Bernheim Forest and its mission was often the result
of layers of compromise. The realities of budget constraints and
the physical landscape itself intersected with the founder’s
changing and at times ambivalent intentions. The history of
Bernheim Forest evolved out of these contingencies. Within the
“Parks are for people”:
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from 1929 to 19501
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first decade of its establishment, the Bernheim Foundation’s
property split into two distinct land management areas: the highly
landscaped park-arboretum and the more primitive forest. I.W.
Bernheim had a human-centered concept of how his Estate would
serve the people of Kentucky and was more interested in the
development of the arboretum. Over time, the board decided to
serve the people of Kentucky by emphasizing a preservation
agenda—a course not always immediately understood or readily
accepted by the community. 
An exploration of changing land-use practices at Bernheim
Forest is important for several reasons. No published
environmental histories exist that bring together Bernheim
Forest’s ecological and institutional record. This paper will touch
on areas often neglected by environmental historians; namely, the
recreation controversy during the interwar years and the role of
private non-industrial forests in conservation. Bernheim Forest
deserves a closer look because it is the largest privately owned
forest in the state of Kentucky. The history of Bernheim Forest’s
land use and development is unique in that the Foundation has
been free from many of the restrictions that define the agendas of
state and federal parks and forests.
I.W. Bernheim was well known in Kentucky for the fortune
he made in whiskey distilling and his philanthropic donations of
public art. He had planned to leave a legacy of a public arboretum
and herbarium on his fifty-acre estate in Anchorage, Kentucky,
but after the premature death of his wife, he sold his property and
moved to Denver, Colorado. An opportunity arose in 1928 for
I.W. Bernheim to purchase a foreclosed thirteen thousand-acre
farm in Bullitt and Nelson counties from a gentleman farmer who
had only recently cobbled together the property out of a heavily
logged forest and abandoned farms. The “bare, unattractive tract
of wild land,” just twenty-five miles south of Louisville, had been
in an economical and ecological free fall by the early twentieth
century.9
This mammoth project was significantly greater in scale and
difficulties than I.W. Bernheim’s original plans, partly due to its
history of environmental abuse. During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, local residents felled trees to fuel the iron
mining and salt industries in the area, and after depleting timber
supplies to the limit of their available technology, the industries
relocated. Locals turned to farming the hilly terrain and
supplemented their income working for the growing whiskey
distilleries and commercial logging enterprises. Logging and
legal whiskey distilling decreased during Prohibition, and many
locals exhausted their farms. One of Bernheim Forest’s early
managers made several failed attempts to grow grain in the 1930s
for the Estate’s workhorses on the former farmland, but found the
soil’s nutrients too depleted.10 In fact, work on the arboretum and
the nurseries were held up for several years because the area
required extensive soil conditioning.11 After logging enterprises
abandoned cutover land that was no longer profitable,
uncontrolled forest fires burned away the top layer of humus and
created serious soil erosion problems.12 Ecological disaster,
outmigration and cheap land gave I.W. Bernheim the opportunity
to move his legacy forward. 
The Bernheim Foundation commissioned several
independent contractors from 1929 to 1950 to survey the property
and make recommendations for land use. Shortly after I.W.
Bernheim purchased the property, he hired John Lafon, a forester
of national repute. Lafon reported that the Foundation had three
choices for land use: allow conditions to continue and let the
forest revert to wilderness, manage the forest for fire protection
only, or intensively manage the forest for a sustainable lumber
yield and scientific research.13 Lafon recommended intense
management, but warned it would require significant capital
expenditure for roads, improvement thinnings, ranger stations,
fencing, a nursery and professional foresters and rangers. The
Foundation created the infrastructure for intensive management,
but did not use it after I.W. Bernheim, in 1936, requested that
work in the forest should be “merely a policy of watchful
waiting.”14
The Foundation hired the Olmsted Brothers Firm in 1932 to
create a more comprehensive plan for the Estate than the Lafon
report, which had entirely ignored the areas of recreation and
wildlife. The Olmsted plan set aside areas for athletics, swimming
pools, and an airplane landing field. The design included a layout
for the arboretum as well as a plan to landscape the entire forested
area.15 The Foundation rejected all but the layout for the
arboretum, which was later modified into a simpler “landscape”
arboretum.16 Though expense was a large factor in the Board’s
rejection of the Olmsted plan, many board members protested the
development of extensive recreational facilities as well as the
firm’s purely aesthetic view of the forest. J.W. Browne, an
influential founding member, urged that a demonstration forest
should be “the most important feature of the estate.”17 The Lacey
Company, another early forestry consultant firm cautioned, in
1929, that a “strictly forestry venture” would be of little interest
to visitors, and later the Olmsted Firm predicted that areas
dedicated to hiking and timber production would be underused.18
However, board meeting minutes and business communications
indicate that board members continued to see their primary goal
as reforestation. Though internal debates continued over whether
to manage the forest area for profit or wilderness preservation, the
Board was more united in resisting the type of development that
would attract visitors.19
In 1948, R.E. Bishop authored a report that satisfied board
members who were in favor of a demonstration site as well as
those who wanted to “preserve the wild state” of the forest.20 He
recommended timber management for profit and only minimal
development of the two hundred-acre arboretum area. Though
Bishop was a proponent of utilitarian forestry, he felt strongly
about preserving the aesthetic beauty of the forest against the
incursions of recreators and their automobiles. Bishop’s report
contains a number of colorful references about motorists and their
“weapons of destruction.”21 Bishop suggested limiting visitor
facilities and access roads to avoid turning the forest into a
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“Coney Island”—or in other words – a state park.22 Bishop
lamented that state parks had deviated from their original purpose
to provide an escape from the “strain of modern life.”23
The United States had witnessed a rapid expansion of State
and National Parks during the years leading up to the Bishop
Report. The creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC)
during the New Deal era helped open state parks to more visitors
by improving roads and recreational facilities, but not everyone
approved of developing the wilderness for modern tourism.
Bernheim Forest, in Bishop’s vision, was in a unique position to
emphasize its “original natural character,” because they did not
have to give in to the pressure of visitors. Bishop did not see his
plans for intensive forest management and preservation of natural
beauty as antithetical, but they were incompatible with recreation.
He cited I.W. Bernheim’s wish to provide the public “a place to
further their love of the beautiful in nature” to justify barring
athletics, concessions, camping and even scenic drives.24
The Foundation’s chief forester, Frank Bunce followed up on
the Bishop Report with his own master plan in 1951. The plan
acknowledged the “unavoidable conflict between recreational use
and conservation” on the Estate. Bunce interpreted I.W.
Bernheim’s desire that the Estate be “for the use of the people” as
akin to scientific forestry’s conservation principle, which is the
“greatest good for the greatest number.” But unlike the earlier era
of utilitarian forest, Bunce added an ecological basis to the
forest’s value. With the exception of the Olmsted Brothers Firm,
who were only minimally interested in the forest area, Bunce’s
report was the first plan that did not suggest timber production.
His report catalogued the forest’s assets in terms of its watershed
and habitat protection, educational opportunities, scenery and
recreation. Bunce was less hostile to recreation than Bishop and
he approved of camping, scenic driving, fishing and other
activities that did not require “natural beauty [to be] impaired by
extensive development.”25 The push for outdoor recreation
increased after World War II with the democratization of the
automobile, the shorter workweek and mandatory vacations.
After Bernheim Forest opened to the public in 1950, visitation
began to strain its existing infrastructure and the Foundation and
its managerial staff looked for ways to solve the dilemma. Bunce
suggested a policy to minimize publicity of the park’s recreational
aspects, and in 1951 the Board dropped the word “park” from
Bernheim Forest and Park, to simply Bernheim Forest. Bunce’s
published articles, lectures and letters rarely mentioned Bernheim
Forest’s recreational mission, although a brochure from 1962 lists
“recreation” as one of its five “Purposes and Aims.” The other
four were a “wildlife refuge,” “education in nature appreciation,”
“preservation of a wilderness,” and “wildlife restoration and
research” with very little emphasis on visitors.26
The bulk of I.W. Bernheim’s private and official
correspondence with the Board centered on just two hundred
acres of the Estate, known as the Park. He wanted the area
developed into an arboretum, natural history museum and art
gallery based on the landscape design proposed by the Olmsted
Brothers Firm 1932. Many board members were less interested in
the Park’s progress, and abandoned building the museum after
I.W. Bernheim’s handpicked museum director had been on the
payroll for several years. 
The Foundation struggled with its mission to serve the public
from the very first years. As early as 1932, board members felt it
was necessary to regain “moral control of the premises” in
response to joyriding, poaching and camping.27 These strategies
included enclosing the twenty square mile property in a double-
stranded barbed wire fence that not only protected game but kept
people out.28 The recreation dilemma became more acute in 1950
after the Forest officially opened to the public. Some board
members feared that too many visitors would undermine the
forest’s natural beauty. Visitors, in the words of one forest
manager, were “swarming” to the outdoors motivated by a desire
to escape the city rather than “by a desire to . . . enjoy nature.”29
Board members and forest employees had to navigate through the
consequences of these less than contemplative forms of
recreation. Picnicking and large social gatherings began to
generate tons of garbage, strained existing facilities, and posed a
threat to ecosystems.30
The more vocal board members and the forestry-educated
managers consistently downplayed I.W. Bernheim’s culturally
oriented goals. The founder wanted the budget dedicated to the
arboretum and park area, which he saw as the “main attraction.”
At the same time, administrators complained that most visitors
had to be “inveigled” to try a forest trail.31 A few years after I. W.
Bernheim’s death, forest manager Frank Bunce wrote an article
about Bernheim Forest for The Kentucky Naturalist emphasizing
its conservation mission that could be traced back to the founder’s
keen interest in reforestation and concerns over the nation’s rapid
depletion of resources. Bunce portrayed I.W. Bernheim as a
visionary who “foresaw the need for preservation of large natural
areas.”32 I.W. Bernheim intimated that he wanted his legacy to do
something for the “common man,” and by the 1950s the
Foundation interpreted that to mean protecting and preserving the
beauty of the “natural untouched landscape.”33
I.W. Bernheim’s sometimes vague and contradictory
directions for the forest area set up the conditions for a wide range
of interpretation within the Foundation over the forest’s future.
Budgetary constraints were an issue in the first decade, but
conflict between board members was, by their own admission,
partly to blame for the slow progress on the Estate.34 An early
debate, in 1936, between the President of the Board, C.F. Huhlein
and another member, J.W. Browne, resembled what historians
think of as the classic split between preservation and
conservation. Huhlein wanted to preserve the forest as wild
woodlands and thought preservation was the mission of the
Estate. Huhlein included the following quote in the board minutes
by Secretary Ickes of the Department of the Interior claiming it
coincided with I.W. Bernheim’s wishes. Secretary Ickes had
recently stated: “If I had my way about National Parks I would
create them without a road in it. I would have it impenetrable
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forever . . . a place where man would not try to improve on
God.”35
J.W. Browne, along with several prominent Louisville
conservationists, assumed the Estate would become a revenue
producing demonstration forest that would showcase sustainable
forestry practices. In a private letter to I.W. Bernheim, Browne
criticized the direction the organization was taking under
Huhlein’s leadership. Browne complained that Huhlein was
“always speaking of clumps of sassafras and groves of
persimmons and pawpaws” rather than advancing the Estate.36
J.W. Browne saw himself as a “progressive,” and characterized
Huhlein as a “reactionary” for his sentimental view of the second
growth forest.37
Browne laid some of the blame for the lack of progress on
both I.W. Bernheim’s scientifically and financially impractical
directives, as well as his romantic perception of nature. He
specifically protested I.W. Bernheim’s over reliance on technical
experts like the Olmsted Brothers Firm in day-to-day matters and
his wishes to return to the “horse and buggy days.”38 These two
opposing tendencies Browne observed in 1936, as well as I.W.
Bernheim’s own correspondence, reveal the type of “modern and
anti-modern impulses” that historian Karl Jakoby asserts were at
the core of conservation.39 A 1935 letter to the Board from I.W.
Bernheim was typical of his requests. He wanted reassurance that
the arboretum be “scientifically plotted,” and in the next sentence
requested that the entire forest resemble a “large, very large,
artistic canvas.”40 I.W. Bernheim, according to Browne’s 1936
letter expected the staff to accomplish large-scale projects—
without tractors. Though Bernheim relented and purchased a
tractor, his nostalgia and lack of interest in timber production
helped tilt forest management in a preservationist direction.
The Board compiled a report in 1936 based on their
correspondence and conversations with I.W. Bernheim, and their
findings exposed and generated confusion over the Foundation’s
mission. Because I.W. Bernheim revealed his plans for the Estate
“bit by bit,” the report was an attempt to reconcile the diverse and
sometimes conflicting directives of the founder.41 Over the course
of sixteen years, goals for the estate ranged from primeval forest
wilderness, utilitarian demonstration forest, arboretum and game
preserve, to museum, art galleries and a recreation park. The
Board concluded that the founder’s primary goals for the Estate
were the development of recreational amenities such as picnic
locales, roads for scenic drives and bridle paths to compliment the
future arboretum and museum.42 The report recalled that at the
time of incorporation the trustees were led to believe that their
objective was to develop the entire estate from a “forestry
standpoint” and that a primeval forest would be the main
attraction for visitors.43 After I.W. Bernheim received the report,
he reassured the Board that maintenance of the wildlife sanctuary
and reforestation of the more heavily logged areas were a
“sacred” task, although secondary to the arboretum.44 The report’s
writer expressed I.W. Bernheim’s growing interest in the
arboretum-park as one of the “major problems” facing the
estate.45
I.W. Bernheim wrote, in several letters, of his desire to do
something for “the common-man” in connection with his
philanthropy. In a 1943 letter to his grandson, he shared his hope
that the natural landscape on the Estate would foster, in regular
citizens, a sense of liberty, justice and equality. Nature, he
believed, was free from class distinctions, racism, and religious
persecution.46 These sentiments express Progressive Era
perceptions that nature could “restore civic virtue” and act as a
source of “moral authority.”47 I.W. Bernheim’s philosophical
outlook had little to do with utilitarian forestry and preservation
for preservation’s sake, and tended toward a more people-
centered agenda. A 1939 letter, to be read annually to the Board
and cited by the Foundation as Bernheim Forest’s original
mission statement, the founder specified his dream. He reiterated
his desire for a natural history museum, art gallery and an
arboretum that should be “forever free” for the people of
Kentucky.48 He did not directly mention conservation in this
seminal letter and instead focused on the Park area and its
recreational aspects. While I.W. Bernheim often said the Estate
was for the “use of the people,” he was also clear that certain
forms of recreation should not be considered. It was his belief that
consumer oriented and overly mechanized recreation should have
no place on the Estate.49
The plans to build an arboretum and recreational area on a
small portion of the Estate and leave the majority forested,
prompted board members and people in the community to see
similarities between the Estate and federal and state forests and
parks. In 1932 the Olmsted Brothers firm even recommended
turning over the Estate to a state agency, and they were not the
first to make this suggestion. Lafon’s 1929 report talked about the
possibility of turning the land over to state or federal agencies, but
for different reasons than the Olmsted Firm. The landscape
architects with the Olmsted Firm felt their comprehensive plan
for recreation facilities would prove too burdensome. As a
forester, Lafon did not discuss the recreation potential in his
report. In fact, he believed that if the Estate were used for
anything but intensive forestry to produce timber for the market,
then the land should not be left in private hands.50
Historically, private nonprofits “have acquired
environmentally valuable lands for transfer to public agencies,”
but the Bernheim Foundation proceeded in a different direction.51
In 1935, the U.S. Forest Service requested that the Foundation
donate land to the state to form part of a 100,000-acre forest. I.W.
Bernheim personally responded to the request in a letter stating
that his “property was intended to fill services entirely
incompatible with those rendered by the government.”52 Board
members, however, were faced with fiscal and physical realities
that, in their minds, necessitated cooperation with the state.
Stipulations of the trust agreement limited the flow of money
from the corpus of the trust into the operating budget of the
Foundation until after the grantor’s death. Cooperation with state
agencies during the Great Depression helped stretch Bernheim
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Forest’s reduced annual budget. In 1933, the Kentucky Welfare
Society furnished two hundred men providing 7,265 man-days of
work in exchange for meals and a place for the workers to go
during the day.53 State agencies also provided hard to find
technical expertise. Bernheim Forest’s remoteness limited the
labor pool to the population of subsistence farmers living in the
immediate vicinity—individuals who some of the board members
viewed as a “primitive type of lawless people.”54 In 1929, the
Estate could afford only six men to do all of the outdoor work and
patrol the forty-two mile perimeter to prevent trespassing,
poaching and fire hazards. 
Concurrent with the management challenges at Bernheim
Forest, the Commonwealth of Kentucky was looking to capture
the revenue generated from the lucrative sports-hunting industry.
In 1934, the National Resources Board estimated that “hunters
and tourists spent $10,000,000 in pursuit of game” in Kentucky,
while the real value of wildlife resources was about half of that
figure.55 In 1930, the Bernheim Board contracted with the State
Fish and Game Commission land for the State to propagate
wildlife in exchange for a game warden at no cost to the
Foundation. State officials released exotic elk-sized European red
deer, while at the same time, they exterminated the predators of
deer and predators of valuable furbearing animals.56 These actions
led to severe damage to the forest undergrowth and the
arboretum’s nursery. I.W. Bernheim demanded and received an
end to the contract, over the protests of board members. Within a
few years of I.W. Bernheim’s death, the Foundation signed a ten-
year contract with the Kentucky Division of Fish and Game and
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to manage the entire property
as a big game refuge. And in 1959, the Foundation leased the
4000-acre “south block” to create Knob State Forest, because the
Estate could not adequately patrol the area.
Even if Bernheim Forest had not needed the help of state
agencies, it is unlikely that the Board would have made a radical
departure from the style of land management practiced in most of
the nation’s public forests. The hiring pool of expert contractors
and forest managers was the same for private entities and
government owned land. From 1929 to 1950 the Foundation went
through six managing superintendents of which the majority were
graduates of forestry school.57 Some of the Estate’s early
managers, Ronald Craig, T.W. McKinley and Frank Bunce
worked for many years in the U.S. Forest and National Park
Services before their employment at Bernheim Forest. With the
exception of the European red deer problem, Bernheim Forest’s
managers were comfortable working with governmental
organizations. 
The Bernheim Estate was established during a period of
vigorous debate about land use in Kentucky by state and local
activists, scientists and businessmen. These debates centered on
three broad areas; utilitarian conservation, wilderness
preservation and outdoor recreation which often overlapped. 
Unlike state and federal parks and forests, the Bernheim
Foundation did not rely on public funding, but its evolution was
determined to a certain extent by public opinion. Governing board
members and the managing foresters wanted to take the Estate in
a direction that reflected various issues in the contemporary
conservation discourse. The Courier-Journal and the Herald-Post
ran articles on the incorporation of the Bernheim Foundation in
July of 1929. Both articles reflect on the numerous possibilities
for the Estate’s future and the community’s expectations for its
use. 
According to the Louisville Times, I.W. Bernheim purchased
the land for “the purpose of returning it to its primitive state and
affording a permanent bird and animal sanctuary.”58 The article
reported that I.W. Bernheim’s wish was for the public to use the
forest and arboretum “in the same manner and for the same
purposes as State and National forests and parks.”59 The
importance of the Estate, at least from the journalist’s perspective,
was the Foundation’s choice to manage the forest intensively for
a timber crop, in an effort to save “Kentucky’s diminishing timber
lands.”60 They did not perceive the plans for wilderness
preservation, recreation, and timber production as contradictory
objectives. 
Later that month the Herald-Post covered the story with the
headline “Foundation to Protect Natural Beauty and Wild Life
Against ‘Improvements’ and Hunters.”61 This article focused on
the proposed game sanctuary and did not mention timber
management or the arboretum. The article asserted that the Estate
would not attempt to create a park, and that nothing would be
done to interfere with “its natural beauty.”62 In the same edition,
an interview with Tom Wallace about Kentucky’s reforestation
problem contained the following quote:
“It is most fortunate that the Bernheim Foundation
will administer the tract. It could not be turned over
to the State as a gift with any prospect of intensive
management beginning at once, as it will have in its
existing circumstances.”63
I.W. Bernheim was clearly invested in providing recreation
on his newly acquired property. The 1929 Articles of
Incorporation state that the grantor donated his land to Kentucky
for “use as a public park.” However, he impressed upon the board
members in the same year that he did not want “the park to be
thrown open to campers, particularly those of the ‘motor gypsy
variety’.”64 The automobile made ‘gypsying’ possible, and
expanded the vacation experience beyond elite hotel resorts to
include the middle class. This new form of recreation was
accompanied by an invasion of “consumerism, tourism,
mechanization, advertising, landscape architecture” into the
natural environment.65 “Auto-camping” boosted the local
economy but harmed ecosystems and, in the opinion of many,
undermined the aesthetics of nature.66
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In I.W. Bernheim’s seminal 1939 letter outlining major
future projects and the overarching mission of the Estate, he
inserted a sentence expressly forbidding the sale of merchandise
within the park. I.W. Bernheim’s wishes for the Estate evolved
and were often vague and contradictory. He remained, however,
very clear in his objections to camping, commerce, hunting and
government management on the Estate. The founder’s wishes for
recreational activity on the Estate were nuanced and were most
likely a response to the collision of his Progressive Era romantic
view of nature with the commercialization of natural areas during
New Deal conservation. 
The early years of Bernheim Forest’s history were crucial to
its present incarnation. Board minutes, letters, and institutional
documents show that the founder wanted to provide a recreation
oriented park, and was not as interested in the forest area. Over
time, the Board, managing foresters and consultants refashioned
the concept of developing the Estate “for the use of the people”
into something less accessible to the public for recreation. If the
public had a voice in this direction, Bernheim Forest would
probably resemble a state park or forest. Instead, the Bernheim
Foundation steered the estate in a preservationist direction. By the
1950s, the Foundation began limiting recreation to activities
compatible with promoting environmental stewardship, a concept
that has changed over time. After the Second World War, board
members and managers adopted an ecology-oriented strategy that
helped align Bernheim Forest’s recreation, preservation and
conservation mission. This case study of Bernheim Forest reveals
a more complex story than the macro level understanding of the
politics and philosophy behind the conservation movement.
Though the Foundation’s history should be viewed within the
context of the interwar years, many of the policies were driven by
individual visions. Ultimately, the people who influenced and
shaped the development of Bernheim Forest cannot be put into
the discrete categories that represent the factions in the
conservation movement. 
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